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Abstract
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine
how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate
volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks, and display excess response to the aggregate shocks, as in Lucas [14]. For any
given variance of aggregate shocks, the upper bound on aggregate volatility is linearly increasing in
the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks. Our results hold in a setting of symmetric agents with linear
best responses and normal uncertainty. We establish our results by providing a characterization
of the set of all joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any
information structure. This tractable characterization, extending results in Bergemann and Morris
[8], can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the statistical
moments of the economy.
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1. Introduction
Consider an economy of interacting agents, each of whom picks an action. Agents are subject
to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. A classical economic question in this environment is to
ask how aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks map into "aggregate volatility" - the variance of the
average action. Versions of this question arise in many different economic contexts. In particular,
a central question in macroeconomics is how aggregate and individual productivity shocks translate
into variation in GDP. Another classical question is when and how asymmetric information can
influence this mapping, and in particular exacerbate aggregate volatility. A diffi culty addressing
this question is that the answer depends on the nature of the asymmetric information, something
that is not easily observed. Thus results may be sensitive to the exact information structure
assumed.
This paper considers a very simple stylized economy where we can completely characterize what
can happen for all information structures. In particular, we consider a setting with a continuum
of agents with linear best responses that depend on the average action of others and idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks. We assume that shocks, actions and signals are symmetrically normally
distributed across agents, maintaining symmetry and normality of the information structure. Our
sharp characterization of what can happen across all information structures in this symmetric
normal class can be used to address many economic questions of interest. In particular, we can
study the two classical questions described above, providing an upper bound on aggregate volatility
as a function of fundamentals and identifying the critical information structures that give rise to
maximal volatility.
The information structure that maximizes aggregate volatility turns out to be "noise free": each
agent observes a one-dimensional signal which is a deterministic function of his idiosyncratic and
the aggregate shock. While there is no noise in such signals, they are imperfect because they
leave the agent uncertain about the size of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The shocks
are confounded in the agent’s signal. Aggregate volatility is highest when signals overweigh the
aggregate shock relative to the idiosyncratic shock. In this case, agents who want to tailor their
actions to their idiosyncratic shocks have no choice but to overweigh the aggregate shock, generating
aggregate volatility. We show how maximum aggregate volatility increases linearly in the variance
of the idiosyncratic shocks even if the variance of aggregate shocks is held constant. The critical
noise free signal generating the maximal aggregate volatility puts proportionately more weight on
the aggregate shock of constant variance as the variance of the idiosyncratic shock becomes larger.
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These noise free information structures are also critical for many questions of interest, including
for dispersion (the variance of individual actions around the mean action) and individual volatility
(the variance of individual actions, which is equal to the sum of aggregate volatility and dispersion).
But different noise free information structures maximize these variables. Thus dispersion is highest
when signals overweigh the idiosyncratic shock relative to the aggregate shock. In this case, agents
who want to tailor their actions to their aggregate shocks have no choice but to overweigh the
idiosyncratic shock, generating dispersion.
The fact that confounding shocks can lead to overreaction has been long recognized, notably
by Lucas [14] and more recently by Hellwig and Venkateswaran [11] and Venkateswaran [21]. Our
contribution is to highlight that, in this setting with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, noise free
confounding information structures are extremal and provide global bounds on how much volatility
can arise via the information structure. The intuition for the bounding result is simple and comes in
two parts. First, suppose that agents observed a one-dimensional signal that was a linear function
of the idiosyncratic shock, the aggregate shock and a noise term which may be correlated across
agents. Equilibrium actions must be linear in the signal. The impact of the noise in the signal must
be to dampen the response of agents to the signal and thus to both the idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks. Thus among one-dimensional symmetric information structures, noise free information
structures generate the most volatility. Second, imagine any other, perhaps multidimensional and
perhaps noisy, symmetric information structure. By symmetry, each agent’s equilibrium action
choice (assumed to be one-dimensional) can be expressed as a linear function of the idiosyncratic
shock, the aggregate shock and a noise term which may be correlated across agents. Now we can
replace the original information structure by the one-dimensional one where each agent observes
a signal which is linear in the equilibrium action he would have chosen under the old information
structure. Equilibrium in this new information structure will now generate the same outcomes as
the equilibrium with the richer information structure. Thus it is enough to study one-dimensional
information structures where signals are a linear function of the idiosyncratic shock, the aggregate
shock and a noise term which may be correlated across agents.
We provide a complete characterization of the symmetric equilibrium distributions of individual
actions, aggregate actions, idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate shocks that can arise for a given
distribution of payoff shocks across all possible information structures. The direct characterization
of all feasible equilibrium distributions - independent of the information structure - makes use of a
solution concept, Bayes correlated equilibria, introduced in earlier work by two of us, Bergemann
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and Morris [8], [8]. Namely, the set of Bayes correlated equilibrium distributions is equal to the set
of Bayes Nash equilibrium distributions under all possible information structures. And in particular,
the boundary of the set of Bayes correlated, and hence Bayes Nash equilibria, can be written as
the (Bayes Nash) equilibrium of some noise free and one-dimensional information structure. The
resulting bounds of the aggregate volatility are independent of the assumption of normality of the
shocks, and only depend on the variance of the idiosyncratic and the aggregate shocks.
While noise free information structures generate maximal aggregate volatility with both idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate shocks, this is not longer true if there are only idiosyncratic shocks. In this
case, if each agent responded to his idiosyncratic shock only, there would be no aggregate volatility
by the law of large numbers. On the other hand, if each agent had no information about his idio-
syncratic shock, his action would be constant and there would again be no aggregate volatility. The
information structure which maximizes aggregate volatility would be one where each agent observes
his idiosyncratic shock with an intermediate level of noise, and where the noise in agents’signals
is perfectly correlated. Angeletos and La’O [4] have analyzed the role of such aggregate shocks to
beliefs about purely idiosyncratic uncertainty in a macroeconomic model, describing them as "sen-
timent" shocks. How can we relate this finding that - with only idiosyncratic shocks - adding noise
maximizes aggregate volatility to our finding that - adding aggregate shocks - noise can only de-
crease aggregate volatility? We can reconcile the results by considering what happens if we let the
variance of aggregate shocks decline towards zero in our model. In this case, our results show that
the information structure that maximizes aggregate volatility is a noise free information structure
where the signal puts a larger and larger weight on the aggregate shock and a smaller and smaller
weight on the idiosyncratic shock. The agent - in order to respond to the idiosyncratic shock at all
- must put a larger and larger weight on the signal. The total sensitivity to the aggregate shock
(multiplying the weight on the aggregate shock in the signal with the weight on the signal in the
equilibrium strategy) converges to a constant as the aggregate shock disappears. In the limit the
dependence on the aggregate payoff shock becomes dependence on a common, payoff irrelevant,
noise term, i.e., the sentiment shock. Thus this paper highlights a tight connection between noise
free, but confounding information structures and sentiment shocks.
The results described thus far hold independently of whether the weight on the average action, r,
is negative (the strategic substitutes case), zero (the purely decision theoretic case) or positive (the
strategic complementarities case). A striking property of our characterization of Bayes correlated
equilibria - i.e., what can happen in all symmetric information structures - is that the set of feasible
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correlations between individual and average actions and individual and aggregate shocks is inde-
pendent of r and determined only by statistical constraints. There are three degrees of freedom in
describing the correlation structure: the correlation between each agent’s action and his individual
shock (the sum of the aggregate shock and his idiosyncratic shock), the correlation between any
two agents’actions, and the correlation between any agent’s action and any other agent’s individual
shock. On the other hand, once one pins down the correlation structure, the mean and variance
of individual actions are pinned down. The best response parameter r describes how to translate
correlation structures into first and second moments. Thus there is a three-dimensional class of
Bayes correlated equilibria which is extremely tractable.
While we can restrict attention to one-dimensional information structures in deriving bounds on
volatility, we may want to assume that agents have access to particular class of (possibly multidi-
mensional) signals. In general, this will impose restrictions on the set of Bayes Nash equilibria and
the upper bounds on volatility cannot necessarily be obtained. For example, in Angeletos and La’O
[4], each agent knows his individual payoff shock but remains uncertain about the payoff shock of
the other agents. In Angeletos and Pavan [6] the agents have access to a rich three-dimensional class
of normal signals, and even though the set of Bayes correlated equilibria is also three-dimensional,
the information structures of Angeletos and Pavan [6] do not give rise to maximal volatility.
This paper is an application of a general approach to analyzing equilibrium behavior of agents
for a given description of the fundamentals for all possible information structures. In Bergemann
and Morris [9], we consider this problem in a canonical game theoretic setting and show that a
general version of Bayes correlated equilibrium characterizes the set of outcomes that could arise in
any Bayes Nash equilibrium of an incomplete information game where agents may have access to
more information beyond the given common prior over the fundamentals. In Bergemann and Morris
[8] we pursue this argument in detail and characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in the
class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty, but there we restrict
our attention to the special environment with aggregate shocks only. By providing a complete
analysis of the impact of information in a simple linear quadratic model with both idiosyncratic
and aggregate payoff shocks, we can connect with richer macroeconomic and other applied models
that work with parameterized classes of information structures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
introduces the noise free information structures and analyzes the Bayes Nash equilibrium behavior
for this class of information structures. Section 4 derives the maximal volatility and dispersion in
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a benchmark model without strategic interaction. We identify the specific noise free information
structure that attains the maximal volatility, and thus establish the link between information and
volatility. Section 5 examines how the strategic interaction affects how the information structure
impacts the statistical moments of the economy. In Section 6, we introduce symmetric Bayes
correlated equilibria and establish an equivalence between the set of Bayes correlated equilibria
and the set of Bayes Nash equilibria under any symmetric normal information structure. Section
7 then considers some particular information structures that have been studied, and highlights
the subtle restrictions that such modelling choices imposes on the equilibrium behavior. Section 8
indicates how the present analysis extends beyond aggregate interaction to allow for richer, network
like, interaction structures. Finally, we apply the currents insights to the related literature on
information sharing and obtain optimal information sharing rules that differ and improve upon
those appearing in the literature. Section 9 constitutes the appendix and contains most of the
proofs.
2. Model
We consider a continuum of agents, with mass normalized to 1. Agent i ∈ [0, 1] chooses an
action ai ∈ R and is assumed to have a quadratic payoff function,
ui : R3 → R,





and the individual payoff shock, θi ∈ R, thus ui (ai, A, θi).
We assume that the individual payoff shock θi is given by the sum of an aggregate shock θ̄ and
an idiosyncratic shock ∆θi :
θi = θ̄ + ∆θi.
The aggregate shock θ̄ is common to all agents and the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi is identically
and independently distributed across agents, as well as independent of the aggregate shock. Each
component of the payoffshock θi is normally distributed. The payoffenvironment is thus completely






















which form the commonly known common prior. The sample average of the idiosyncratic shocks
across all agents always equals zero. We denote the sample average across the entire population,
that is across all i, as Ei [·], and so Ei [∆θi] = 0. The aggregate shock can be interpreted as the
sample mean or average payoff shock, and so θ̄ = Ei[θi].
Given the independence and the symmetry of the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi across agents, the
variance of the individual payoff shock θi can be expressed in terms of the variance of the sum of
the idiosyncratic and the aggregate shock:













and the covariance between individual payoff shocks θi and θj equals the covariance between the
individual shock θi and the aggregate shock θ. Thus, the correlation coeffi cient ρθθ represents a
measure of the “commonality” of the shocks across agents. Separately, from the perspective of
a given agent i, the correlation coeffi cient ρθθ measures the relative contribution of the aggregate
shock θ to the individual shock of agent i, θi = θ̄ + ∆θi.
Given the quadratic property of the payoff function, each agent i has a linear best response
function:
ai = rE[A|Ii] + E[θi|Ii], (4)
where E[·|Ii] is the expectation conditional on the information Ii that agent i has prior to taking
an action ai. The parameter r ∈ R of the best response function represents the strategic interaction
among the agents. If r < 0, then we have a game of strategic substitutes, if r > 0, then we have a
game of strategic complements.
For future reference, we briefly describe the Nash equilibrium under complete information. If













1− r . (5)
In the complete information equilibrium, each agent assigns weight 1 to the idiosyncratic shock
∆θi, and weight 1/ (1− r) to the aggregate shock θ̄. We assume that the interaction parameter r is
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bounded above, or r ∈ (−∞, 1), which guarantees that there is a unique interior Nash equilibrium.
1
The present model of a continuum of players with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks was first proposed by Vives [23] to analyze information sharing
among agents with private, but noisy, information about the fundamentals. While the focus of
the present paper is rather different, we shall briefly indicate in the conclusion how our approach
also yields new insights to the large literature on information sharing. In the information sharing
literature, the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shock, are often referred to as the common value and
the private value component of the payoff shock θi.
3. Noise Free Bayes Nash Equilibrium
We begin the analysis by considering a class of noise free information structures and then derive
the Bayes Nash equilibrium behavior under these one-dimensional information structures. We
consider the following one-dimensional class of signals:
si , λ∆θi + (1− λ)θ̄, (6)
where the linear composition of the signal si is determined by the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. We restrict
attention to symmetric information structures (across agents), all agents have the same parameter
λ, and hence simply refer to the noise free information structure λ. In the present section, we
consider the case of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, thus ρθθ ∈ (0, 1), and we discuss the limit
cases of pure idiosyncratic and pure aggregate shocks, thus ρθθ ∈ {0, 1}, in the next section.
The information structure λ is noise free in the sense that every signal si is a linear combination
of the idiosyncratic and the aggregate shock, ∆θi and θ̄, and no extraneous noise or error term
enters the signal of each agent. Nonetheless, since the signal si combines the idiosyncratic and the
1The best response (4) normalizes the weight on the payoff shock θi to 1 and assigns the weight r to the average
action A. A subset of us adopted this normalization, Bergemann and Morris [8], and we can directly contrast the
results of the pure aggregate shock model there with the model of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks here. An
alternative normalization would assign weights 1 − r to the payoff shock and r to the average action, as in Morris
and Shin [16] or Angeletos and Pavan [5]. With pure aggregate shocks, the later normalization has the advantage
that under complete information, the equilibrium volatility of the individual or the aggregate action is independent
of r, whereas in the present model r scales the volatility. Yet, in a general model with idiosyncratic and aggregate




= (1− r) ∆θi + θ) and hence
this normalization would also fail to preserve the invariance property for the individual volatility.
8
aggregate shock, each signal si leaves agent i with residual uncertainty about the contribution of the
idiosyncratic and aggregate shock respectively. Moreover, unless the weight λ in the information
structure exactly mirrors the composition of the payoff shock, θi = θ̄+∆θi, and hence exactly equals
1/2, agent i still faces residual uncertainty about his payoff shock θi. Thus, the signal confounds
the two sources of payoff uncertainty.
Given the information structure λ, we can compute the conditional expectation of agent i given
the signal si about the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi:2






2 + (1− ρθθ)λ2
si, (7)














2 + (1− ρθθ)λ2
si, (8)
and the payoff shock θi of agent i :




ρθθ (1− λ) + (1− ρθθ)λ
ρθθ (1− λ)
2 + (1− ρθθ)λ2
si. (9)
For the above conditional expectations, it is only the relative size of idiosyncratic and aggregate






A few noise free information structures are of particular interest. If λ = 1/2, then each agent
knows his own payoff shock θi, as (9) reduces to E [θi |si ] = 2si = ∆θi + θ̄, but remains uncertain
about the exact value of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shock. Similarly, if λ = 0, then the




= si = θ, but there remains
residual uncertainty about the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi and a fortiori about the payoff shock θi.
Likewise, if λ = 1, then the idiosyncratic shock is known with certainty, as E [∆θi |si ] = si = ∆θi,
but there remains residual uncertainty about the aggregate shock θ̄ and a fortiori about the payoff
shock θi.
We record the standard solution concept for games of incomplete information.
2For the remainder of the paper, we report all of the conditional expectations under the normalization of µθ = 0.
With µθ 6= 0, the conditional expectations, such as (7)-(9) below, are given by a convex combination of the signal
si and prior mean µθ. By normalizing µθ = 0, the statistical expressions become easier to read with minor loss of
generality. By contrast, the description of the equilibrium in terms of mean and variance, as in Proposition 2, are
always stated for µθ ∈ R.
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Definition 1 (Bayes Nash Equilibrium).
The strategy profile a∗ : R→ R forms a pure strategy symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium if and only
if:
a∗ (si) = E[θi + r
∫
a∗j (sj) dj | si], ∀si ∈ R.
The construction of a linear and symmetric equilibrium strategy in the multivariate normal
environment is by now standard, see Vives [24] and Veldkamp [20]. Given an information structure
λ, we denote the responsiveness, and in the linear strategy, the slope of the strategy in the signal
si, by w(λ).
Proposition 1 (Noise Free BNE ).
For every noise free information structure λ, there is a unique Bayes Nash equilibrium and the
strategy of each agent i is linear in the signal si :
a∗i (si) = w (λ) si, (10)
with weight w (λ) :
w(λ) =
ρθθ(1− λ) + (1− ρθθ)λ
(1− r)ρθθ(1− λ)2 + λ2(1− ρθθ)
. (11)
The responsiveness of the individual strategy is in general affected by the interaction parameter
r, but in the special case of r = 0, each agent solves an pure statistical prediction problem and
the optimal weight corresponds to the Bayesian updating rule given by (9). If r > 0, then the
agents are in a game with strategic complements and respond stronger to the signal than Bayesian
updating would suggest because of the inherent coordination motive with respect to the aggregate
shock represented by the weight ρθθ(1− λ)2.
In every noise free information structure, the best response of each agent i is always summarized
by a scalar, w (λ). To understand the impact the information structure has on the outcome of the
equilibrium we provide a statistical description in terms of first and second moments of the variables
(actions and payoff shocks) induced by an equilibrium. Given the information structure λ and the
linearity of the unique Bayes Nash equilibrium, we can immediately derive the properties of the
joint distribution of the equilibrium variables.
Proposition 2 (Moments of the Noise Free BNE).
For every noise free information structure λ:
1. the mean of the individual and the aggregate action is:
E[ai] , µa = µθ/ (1− r) = µA , E[A];
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2. the variance of the individual action is:
var (ai) , σ2a = w(λ)2(ρθθ(1− λ)2 + (1− ρθθ)λ2)σ2θ; (12)
3. and the variance of the aggregate action is:
var (A) = cov(ai, aj) , ρaaσ2a = w(λ)2ρθθ(1− λ)2σ2θ. (13)
The mean of the individual and the aggregate action is only a function of the mean µθ of the
payoffshock θi and the interaction parameter r, and thus is invariant with respect to the composition
of the payoff shocks in terms of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks and invariant with respect to
the information structure λ. By contrast, the second moments, respond to the composition of the
shocks as represented by the correlation coeffi cient ρθθ and to the information structure λ. Given
the normal distribution of the payoff shocks, and the linearity of the strategy, the variance and
covariance terms are naturally the products of the weights, λ and w (λ), and the variance σ2θ of the
fundamental uncertainty.
In the symmetric environment, the variance of the aggregate action, var (A), coincides with
covariance between any pair of actions by agents i and j, ai and aj, cov(ai, aj), and we denote the
correlation coeffi cients by ρaa. The covariance between the action ai and the payoff shock θi of
agent i, is given by:
cov(ai, θi) , ρaθσaσθ = w(λ) (ρθθ(1− λ) + (1− ρθθ)λ)σ2θ =
ρθθ(1− λ) + (1− ρθθ)λ√
ρθθ(1− λ)2 + (1− ρθθ)λ2
σ2θ, (14)
whereas the covariance between the action ai of agent i and the payoff shock θj of another agent j
is given by:
cov(ai, θj) , ρaφσaσθ = w(λ)(1− λ)ρθθσ2θ = cov(ai, θ̄) = cov(A, θ). (15)
We denote the corresponding correlation coeffi cients by ρaθ and ρaφ, respectively.
As the above equalities indicate, in the symmetric environment, the covariance between the
individual action ai of agent i and the payoff shock θj of another agent j, cov(ai, θj), is equal to
the covariance between the aggregate action A and aggregate shock θ. After all, the idiosyncratic
element vanishes in the covariance between ai and θj, and what remains is the covariance between
the common terms, A and θ. Importantly though, the correlation coeffi cients ρaφ and ρAθ differ as
we can compute that
ρaφ =
(1− λ)ρθθ√





Thus under any noise free information structure parametrized by λ, the aggregate action A is
perfectly correlated with the aggregate shock θ.
In their statistical content, the correlation coeffi cients reflect the direction in the relationship
of any two random variables. Hence, the interaction parameter r which only affects the slope of
the equilibrium strategy, but not the composition of the signals, does not appear in the expression
of the equilibrium correlation coeffi cients. Thus, for a given noise free information structure λ, we
could, as an alternative to Proposition 2 completely characterize the Bayes Nash equilibrium in




. This triple only depends on the composition of
the payoff shocks, ρθθ and the information structure λ. We could then recover all the moments of
the equilibrium distribution, such as mean and variance, from the triple of correlation coeffi cients
and the interaction parameter r.
4. Individual Decisions and Aggregate Volatility
We first consider aggregate volatility in the absence of any strategic interaction, and thus we
are setting the strategic parameter r equal to zero. While we focus on aggregate volatility, we will
also report results for individual volatility and dispersion.
With r = 0, the best response of each agent simply reflects a statistical prediction problem,
namely to predict the payoff shock θi given the signal si:
ai = E [θi |si ] =
(1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ)
(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ)
si. (16)
The individual prediction problem is more responsive to the signal si if and only if the signal
contains more information about the payoff shock θi. As we observed, the noise free information
structure λ = 1/2 allows each agent to perfectly infer the individual payoff shock θi. It follows that







Now, to the extent that the individual payoff shocks θi and θj are correlated, we find that even
though each agent i only solves an individual prediction problem, their actions are correlated by
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means of the underlying correlation of the individual payoffshocks. Under the information structure






We can now ask whether the aggregate volatility can reach higher levels under information structures
different from λ = 1/2. As the information structure departs from λ = 1/2, we necessarily introduce
a bias in the signal si towards one of the two components of the payoff shock θi. Clearly, the signal
si is losing informational quality with respect to the payoff shock θi as λ moves away from 1/2. Thus
the individual prediction problem (16) is becoming noisier, and in consequence the response of the
individual agent to the signal si is attenuated. But a larger weight, 1−λ, on the aggregate shock θ,
may support correlation in the actions across agents, and thus support larger aggregate volatility.
At the same time, the response of the agent is likely to be attenuated, and thus a trade-off appears
between bias and loss of information. We then ask what is the maximal aggregate volatility that
can be sustained across all noise free information structures.
Proposition 3 (Maximal Aggregate Volatility).













is achieved by the information structure λ∗ :
















The aggregate volatility is maximized by an information structure which biases the signal towards
the aggregate shock.
We recall from (2) that the total variance of the payoff shock θi is given by σ2θ = σ
2
θ̄
+ σ2∆θi . By
a change of variable, we can express the variance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate components of







= (1− ρθθ)σ2θ. (19)
We can then express the information structure that maximizes the aggregate volatility in terms of











and the maximal volatility given by (17) can be expressed as:
max
λ








Thus, as we approach the environment with aggregate shocks only, ρθθ → 1 (and equivalently
as the contribution from the idiosyncratic shock vanishes with σ2∆θi → 0), the maximal aggregate
volatility of the actions coincides with the variance of the aggregate shock. This is achieved in a
complete information equilibrium in which the action of each agent matches the realization of the
payoff shock θi. As all of the variance in the payoff shock θi stems from the aggregate shock, the
variance of the individual action is attained by the variance of the average action.
More surprisingly, as we approach an environment with purely idiosyncratic shocks, the maximal
aggregate volatility does not converge to zero, rather it is bounded away from 0, and given by σ2∆θi/4,
as stated in the following Corollary of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 (Maximal Volatility with Aggregate or Idiosyncratic Shocks Only).
The maximal volatility with aggregate shocks only is limσ2∆θi→0
maxλ {var(A)} = σ2θ̄, with idiosyn-
cratic shocks only is limσ2
θ̄
→0 maxλ {var(A)} = σ2∆θi/4.
If the individual payoff shock is increasingly dominated by the idiosyncratic shock, then the
information structure puts more and more weight on the aggregate shock which itself has diminish-
ing variance. The volatility maximizing information structure amplifies the response to the small
aggregate shock and hence maintains a substantial correlation in the signals (and actions) across
the agents, even though the payoff shocks are almost purely idiosyncratic and thus almost indepen-
dent. If we consider the ratio of the weighted standard deviations of the aggregate and idiosyncratic

















Thus, the economy can maintain a large aggregate volatility even in the presence of vanishing
aggregate payoff shocks by confounding the payoff relevant information about the idiosyncratic
shock with the (in the limit) payoff irrelevant information about the aggregate shock.
In Section 3 we analyzed the equilibrium behavior in the noise free information structures assum-
ing idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, and hence confining the analysis to ρθθ ∈ (0, 1). The above
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limit argument towards idiosyncratic shocks only suggests that as long as there is some arbitrarily
small variation in the payoff shock, the signal can always amplify the informational importance of
the shock much beyond its payoff importance. But, if there is no variance in either the idiosyncratic
or the aggregate shock, then of course no amplification of those shocks is possible. Nonetheless, the
limits in Corollary 1 can still be attained with zero variance in either one of the shocks, but now
require noise in the signal that is payoff irrelevant. We illustrate this for the case of idiosyncratic
payoff shocks only. Thus, consider an information structure in which each agent i observes a signal
that contains an error ε, common to all agents, with mean 0 and variance σ2ε,
si = ∆θi + ε. (21)
Given the signal si, the best response of agent i is






















and the aggregate volatility is maximized by setting the variance of the error term equal to the











The noisy information structure (21) thus achieves the limit of Corollary 1 with the noise to signal
ratio of 1 implied by (23), which we derived earlier in (20) as the limiting ratio.
The maximal aggregate volatility is therefore achieved by an information structure that finds an
optimal trade-off between biasing the information towards the aggregate shock, and here simply the
common error, and maintaining responsiveness of agent i towards the signal si as given by the best
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response condition (22). Specifically, an increase in the variance σ2ε of the error term leads to larger
aggregate volatility only if the response of each agent to the signal does not become too attenuated.






of the best response is decreasing in the variance σ2ε of the error




, before the response to the signal becomes too weak to generate additional aggregate
volatility.
In the special cases of pure idiosyncratic or pure aggregate shocks, the payoff uncertainty is
described completely by either ∆θi or θ̄, and reduces from a two-dimensional to a one-dimensional
space of uncertainty. In either case, across all λ ∈ [0, 1], there are only two possible noise free
equilibrium outcomes. Namely, either players respond perfectly to the shock of the world (complete
information) or players do not respond at all (zero information). For example, with idiosyncratic
shocks only, that is ρθθ = 0, we have σ
2
∆θi
= σ2θ, and σ
2
θ̄
= 0. Then, the signal si is perfectly
informative for all λ 6= 0 about the idiosyncratic shock, and we are effectively in a complete infor-
mation setting. By contrast, if λ = 0, then the signal si is completely uninformative, and each agent
makes a deterministic choice given the expected value E [∆θi] = 0 of the shock. Correspondingly,
for purely aggregate shocks, the critical value for which the information structure is completely
uninformative is λ = 1. Therefore there is a discontinuity at ρθθ ∈ {0, 1} in the set of noise free
Bayes Nash equilibria, but as the construction of the noisy information structure (21) suggests there
is no discontinuity in the set of outcomes. The reason is simple and stems from the fact that as ρθθ
approaches 0 or 1, one of the dimensions of payoff uncertainty vanishes. Yet we should emphasize,
that even as the payoff shocks approach the case of pure aggregate or pure idiosyncratic shocks, the
part of the fundamental that becomes small can be arbitrarily amplified by the informational weight
λ. For example, as ρθθ → 1, the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi can still be amplified by letting λ → 1
in the construction of the signal (6) above. Thus, the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi acts like a purely
idiosyncratic noise in an environment with aggregate shocks. After all, the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi
only affects the payoffs in a negligible way, but with a large enough weight, it has a non-negligible
effect on the actions that the players take. This suggests that for the case in which the correlation
of shocks approaches the case of pure aggregate or pure idiosyncratic shocks, there is no longer a
sharp distinction between what is noise and what is fundamentals.
The dispersion of the individual action, ∆ai , ai − A,is the volatility of the individual action
beyond the aggregate volatility:
var(∆ai) = (1− ρaa)σ2a.
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The analysis of the maximal dispersion is entirely symmetric to the one for aggregate volatility after
we redefine the relevant variables in the obvious way:
λ̃ , (1− λ), ρ̃θθ , (1− ρθθ).
The result below then follows directly from Proposition 3.



























5. Strategic Decisions and Aggregate Volatility
We proceed to analyze the aggregate volatility in the presence of strategic interaction. We thus
return to the general model with r ∈ (−∞, 1) rather than r = 0 as in the previous section. For each
individual agent the responsiveness of the action to the signal will now depend on the informational
content of the signal as well as the structure of the interaction.
An instructive benchmark for the responsiveness of the action to the signal is the behavior in
the complete information equilibrium. Under complete information, each agent separately observes





. The resulting equilibrium strategy is linear in the shocks and assigns weight 1 to
the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi, and weight 1/ (1− r) to the aggregate shock θ̄, see (5). Given the
linearity of the complete information strategy, a specific one-dimensional noise free information
structure can replicate the outcome under the two-dimensional complete information structure. In
particular, the one-dimensional information structure λ̂ with
λ̂ , 1− r
2− r , (24)




and every signal realization si,
si = λ̂∆θi + (1− λ) θ̄,
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the equilibrium action
a∗i (si) = ∆θi +
θ̄
1− r
coincides with the complete information equilibrium action. Thus for every level of strategic inter-
action, r, there is a noise free information structure λ̂ under which the agents’equilibrium behavior
exactly mimics the complete information Nash equilibrium. Moreover, by inspecting the responsive-
ness to the signal, w (λ), derived earlier in Proposition 1, we find that λ̂ is the unique information
structure among all λ ∈ [0, 1] such that the responsiveness w (λ) is invariant to the relative contri-












In particular, the Bayes Nash equilibrium under the information structure λ̂ always reproduces the
complete information outcome, independent of the composition of the shocks.
We now decompose the responsiveness of the individual action ai into the components of the
payoff shock θi, namely the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi and the aggregate shock θ̄. Given the mul-














= (1− λ)w (λ) . (25)
Proposition 4 (Responsiveness to Fundamentals).
In the noise free Bayes Nash equilibrium with information structure λ:
1. λ ∈ (λ̂, 1)⇔ cov(ai,∆θi)
σ2∆θ
> 1;





Thus, the responsiveness of the action to each component of the payoff shock is determined
by the weight λ that the signal assigns relative to complete information benchmark λ̂. For any
given information structure λ, the responsiveness is stronger than in the complete information
environment for exactly one of the components, and weaker for the other.
We recall from the analysis in the previous section that with purely aggregate shocks, any
residual uncertainty about the payoff shock inevitably reduced the responsiveness of the individual
agent to the aggregate shock, and ultimately reduced the aggregate responsiveness. Similarly,
with idiosyncratic shocks only, the residual uncertainty attenuated the responsiveness to his payoff
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shock θi. By contrast, in the joint presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, the interaction
between the idiosyncratic and the aggregate shock can correlate the responsiveness of the agents
without attenuating the individual response to one of the components, thus leading to a greater
responsiveness to one component of the shock than could be achieved under complete information.
Intuitively, this stems from the fact that part of the responsiveness to one of the components is
loaded onto the other component.
In Figure 1 we plot the responsiveness for the case of ρθθ = 0.5 and different interaction parame-
ters r. The threshold values λ̂r simply corresponds to the critical value λ̂ for each of the considered







. The horizontal black lines represent the responsiveness to
the aggregate shock θ̄ in the complete information equilibrium which is equal to 1/(1− r), and the
responsiveness to the idiosyncratic part, which is always equal to 1. By contrast, the red curves
represent the responsiveness to the aggregate shock along the noise free equilibrium, and the blue










cov ai, , r 0.75
cov ai, i , r 0.75
cov ai, , r 0
cov ai, i , r 0
cov ai, , r 0.75
cov ai, i , r 0.75
Figure 1: Responsiveness to Fundamentals for ρθθ = 1/2
ness to the aggregate shock θ̄ is larger than in the complete information equilibrium, and conversely
for ∆θi. Moreover, we observe that the maximum responsiveness to the aggregate shock is never
attained under either the complete information equilibrium or at the boundary values of λ, at 0 or 1.
This immediately implies that the responsiveness is not monotonic in the informational content. We
now provide some comparative static results with respect to the strategic environment represented
by r.
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Proposition 5 (Informational Weight and Maximal Volatility).
For all ρθθ ∈ (0, 1):





















argmaxλ(1− ρaa)σ2a are strictly decreasing in r;
3. the maximal second moments: maxλ σ2a, maxλ ρaaσ
2
a, maxλ(1− ρaa)σ2a are strictly increasing
in r.
Thus, the maximal volatility, both individual and aggregate, is increasing in the level of com-
plementarity r. Even the maximal dispersion is increasing in r. In the equilibrium with maximum
dispersion, the agents confound the idiosyncratic and aggregate component of the payoff shock and
overreact to the idiosyncratic part, this effect increases with r. This implies that the responsive-
ness to the aggregate shock θ increases, and hence the overreaction to the idiosyncratic shock ∆θi
increases as well. Moreover, the optimal weight on the aggregate shock increases in r for all of the
second moments.
Proposition 6 (Aggregate Volatility).














+ (1− r)σ2∆θi − σθ̄
)2 (26)
and is strictly increasing and without bound in the idiosyncratic uncertainty σ2∆θi.
Importantly, the maximum aggregate volatility is not bounded anymore by the aggregate volatil-
ity of the complete information equilibrium. In fact, the aggregate volatility is increasing without
bounds in the variance of the idiosyncratic shock even in the absence of variance of the aggregate
shock θ. These results are in stark contrast to the complete information equilibrium in which the
aggregate volatility is unaffected by the variance of the idiosyncratic shock. It illustrates in a sim-
ple way that the aggregate volatility may stem from uncertainty about either the aggregate or the
idiosyncratic fundamental. As in the case of individual decision-making, we can consider the limits
of the aggregate volatility as we approach a model of aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks only.
Corollary 3 (Maximal Volatility with Aggregate or Idiosyncratic Shocks Only).
The maximal volatility with only aggregate shocks is limσ2∆θi→0
maxλ {var(A)} = σ2θ̄/ (1− r)
2 and
with only idiosyncratic shocks is limσ2
θ̄
→0 maxλ {var(A)} = σ2∆θi/ (4 (1− r)).
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Confounding Information. The idea that confounding shocks can lead to overreaction goes back
at least to Lucas [14]. In a seminal contribution, he shows how monetary shocks can have a real
effect in the economy, even when under complete information monetary shocks would have no
real effect. As agents observe just a one-dimensional signal (a price) that confounds two shocks,
namely the labor market shock and the monetary supply shock, they necessarily respond to the
two shocks in the same way. By contrast, under complete information they would condition their
hiring decisions only on the labor market conditions. Yet the one-dimensional signal does not allow
them to disentangle both shocks and in equilibrium they respond to both shocks. Thus, this can
be seen as an overreaction to monetary shocks due to “informational frictions”. The idea has been
present also in more recent papers. For example, Venkateswaran [21] uses a similar idea to show how
firms can have an excess reaction to aggregate shocks when these are confounded with idiosyncratic
shocks or Mackowiak and Wiederholt [15] who derive informational frictions in a model of rational
inattention.
In a recent contribution, Angeletos and La’O [4] consider an economy with purely idiosyncratic
payoff shocks that still displays aggregate fluctuations. Each agent is assumed to know the real-
ization of his individual payoff shock but only interacts with a specific trading partner rather than
the aggregate market. Now, even though the payoff uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic, and each
agent knows his own payoff shock, the pairwise interaction leaves each agent uncertain about the
action of his trading partner. It is this uncertainty that can be affected by a common noise term,
and hence generate aggregate volatility across the agents. They interpret this common noise term
as sentiments which generate aggregate fluctuations.
The current analysis allow us to extract some very simple intuitions on when informational
frictions can have a big effect on aggregate outcomes. We saw that as we approach a world of
idiosyncratic uncertainty (ρθθ → 0), the maximum aggregate volatility is bounded away from 0 and
it is achieved by a noise free equilibria. The information structure amplifies the aggregate shock
that has small variance and leads to a big response by the agents provided that the informational
weight on the aggregate shock is suffi ciently large. Thus, we find that in a model with idiosyncratic
uncertainty such as Angeletos and La’O [4], any arbitrarily small aggregate shock can have a huge
effect, that it can be amplified if it receives a suffi ciently large weight in the signal of the agents.
21
6. Equilibrium Behavior for All Information Structures
Until now we have analyzed the outcomes under the Bayes Nash equilibrium for a very special
class of information structures. By contrast, we now describe the equilibrium behavior for all (sym-
metric and normally distributed) information structures. Thus we now allow for noisy rather than
noise free information structures, and we allow for multidimensional rather than one-dimensional
signals. Moreover, the signals, both across dimensions and across agents can have arbitrary corre-
lation structures.
6.1. Definition of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
In order to describe the equilibrium behavior across all possible information structures, we intro-
duce a solution concept, Bayes correlated equilibrium, that describes the behavior (and outcomes)
independent of the specific information structure that the agents may have access to. The set of
Bayes correlated equilibria has the advantage that it can be completely described by a small set of
inequalities on the first and second moments of the equilibrium distribution.
Definition 2 (Bayes Correlated Equilibrium).
The variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a symmetric and normally distributed Bayes correlated equilibrium
if their joint distribution is given by a multivariate normal distribution and for all i and ai :
ai = rE[A|ai] + E[θi|ai]. (27)
The Bayes correlated equilibrium requires that the joint distribution of shocks and actions is such
that for every action ai in the support of the joint distribution the best response satisfies condition
(27). We emphasize that the equilibrium notion does not refer to any information structure or
signals. It is intentionally defined without reference to any specific information structure in contrast
to the notion of Bayes Nash equilibrium that is always defined with reference to a specific information
structure. The only informational restrictions that are imposed by the above equilibrium notion




coincides with common prior,
and (ii) each agent conditions on the information contained in joint distribution, and hence when
choosing action ai forms the conditional expectation. The notion of Bayes correlated equilibrium
was defined earlier in Bergemann and Morris [8], [9]. In the present context, we use it to obtain
bounds on the volatility of equilibrium without reference to a specific information structure to begin
with.
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6.2. Characterization of Bayes Correlated Equilibria
We begin the analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium by reducing the dimensionality of
the variance-covariance matrix. We appeal to the symmetry condition to express the aggregate
variance in terms of the individual variance and the correlation between individual terms. Just
as we described the variance σ2
θ
of the aggregate shock θ in terms of the covariance between any




θ, we can describe the variance of aggregate action σ
2
A in
terms of the covariance of any two individual actions, or σ2A = ρaaσ
2
a. In the discussion following
Proposition 2, we introduced the correlation coeffi cient between action ai and payoff shock θi of
player i by ρaθ:
cov (ai, θi) , ρaθσaσθ,
and the correlation coeffi cient between the action ai of agent i and the payoff shock θj of a different
agent j by ρaφ:
cov (ai, θj) , ρaφσaσθ.




, parameterize the entire variance-covariance ma-
trix, denoted by V, of the joint distribution of (θi, θ̄, ai, A). Now, the covariance between a purely
idiosyncratic random variable and an aggregate random variable is always 0. This implies that both
the covariance between the aggregate action A and the payoffshock θj of player j and the covariance
between the agent i’s action, ai, and the aggregate shock to the payoff shock, θ, are the same as the
covariance between the action of player i and the payoff shock θj of player j, or ρaφσaσθ. Thus we
can reduce the number of variance terms, and in particular the number of correlation coeffi cients
needed to describe the variance-covariance matrix V without any loss of generality.
Lemma 1 (Symmetric Bayes Correlated Equilibrium).
The variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a symmetric and normally distributed Bayes correlated equilibrium
if and only if there exist parameters of the first and second moments,
(
µa, σa, ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ
)
, such


































and for all i and ai :
ai = rE[A|ai] + E[θi|ai]. (29)
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We can now find restrictions on the first and second moments of ai using the best response
condition (29). By taking expectations of (29) and using the law of iterated expectations, we get:
µa = rµa + µθ ⇔ µa =
µθ
1− r . (30)
If we multiply (29) by ai and take expectations we get:
E[a2i ] = rE[aiA] + E[aiθi].
Using (30) we obtain a similar condition for the variance of ai:




We thus have a complete determination of the individual mean and variance. Note that these
conditions do not depend at all on the joint normality of (ai, A, θi, θ̄) as they only used the law of
iterated expectations. Moreover, it is easy to see how one could get similar additional restrictions
for the higher moments of ai which would be relevant for the non-normal case. Now, for V to be
a valid variance-covariance matrix, it has to be positive semidefinite, and this imposes restrictions
on the remaining covariance terms.
Proposition 7 (Characterization).
A multivariate normal distribution of
(
θi, θ̄, ai, A
)
is a symmetric Bayes correlated equilibrium if
and only if :
1. the mean of the individual action is:
µa = µθ/ (1− r) ; (32)





3. the correlation coeffi cients ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ satisfy ρaa, ρaθ ≥ 0 and the inequalities:
(i) (ρaφ)
2 ≤ ρθθρaa, (ii) (1− ρaa)(1− ρθθ) ≥ (ρaθ − ρaφ)2. (34)
We thus identified necessary and suffi cient conditions for the random variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) to
form a Bayes correlated equilibrium. These conditions can be separated into two distinct sets of
requirements: the first set of conditions follow directly from the best response condition (27) and
merely rely on the linearity of the best response; the second set of conditions are purely statistical
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conditions that require that the variance-covariance matrix V of the joint multivariate distribution
constitutes a valid variance-covariance matrix, namely that it is positive semidefinite.
Importantly, both sets of conditions are necessary independent of the assumption of normally
distributed payoff uncertainty. The normality assumption simply ensures that the equilibrium
distributions are completely determined by the first and second moments. Thus, the normality
assumptions allows us to describe the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in terms of restrictions
that are necessary and suffi cient. Nevertheless, for any arbitrary distribution of payoff shocks and
equilibrium actions, the aggregate volatility provided in Proposition 6 will remain a valid bound on
aggregate volatility.
There are two aspects of Proposition 7 that we should highlight. First, the mean µa of the
individual action (and a fortiori the mean of the aggregate action A) is completely pinned down
by the aggregate payoff shock. This implies that any differences across Bayes correlated equilibria
must manifest themselves in the second moments only. Second, the restrictions on the equilibrium
correlation coeffi cients do not at all depend on the interaction parameter r. The restrictions on the
set of equilibrium correlations are purely statistical and stem from the condition that the variance-
covariance matrix V forms a positive semidefinite matrix. By contrast, the mean µa and the variance
σ2a of the individual actions do depend on the interaction parameter r, as they are determined by
the best response condition (29).
We will show in Section 7 that the disentanglement of the set of feasible correlations and the
interaction parameter is possible only if we allow for all possible information structures, i.e. when
we do not impose any restrictions on the private information that agents may have.
In the special case of pure idiosyncratic or pure aggregate shocks the set of outcomes in terms




reduces to a two-dimensional set. The reduction in
dimensionality arises as the correlation coeffi cient ρaφ of action ai and the payoff shock θj is either
zero (in the absence of aggregate shocks) or equal ρaθ (in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks), and
thus redundant in either case. In the case of pure aggregate shocks, ρθθ = 1, the conditions in (34)
reduce to ρaφ = ρaθ, and ρ
2
aθ ≤ ρaa as established earlier in Bergemann and Morris [8].
6.3. Equivalence between Bayes Nash and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
Next we describe the relationship between the joint distributions of
(
θi, θ̄, ai, A
)
that can arise
as Bayes correlated equilibria and the distributions that can arise as Bayes Nash equilibria for
some information structure I = {Si}i∈[0,1]. In contrast to the restriction to one-dimensional noise
free information structure made in Section 3, we now allow for a much larger class of information
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structures, including noisy and multidimensional information structures. In fact, for the present pur-
pose, it is suffi cient to merely require that the associated symmetric equilibrium strategy {ai}i∈[0,1]:
ai : Si → R forms a multivariate normal distribution.
Proposition 8 (Equivalence).
The variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a (normal) Bayes correlated equilibrium if and only if there exists
some information structure I under which the variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
The important insight of the equivalence is that the set of outcomes that can be achieved as a
Bayes Nash equilibrium for some information structure can equivalently be described as a Bayes
correlated equilibrium. Thus, the solution concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium allows us to
study the set of outcomes that can be achieved as a Bayes Nash equilibrium, importantly without
the need to specify a specific information structure. In Bergemann and Morris [9], we establish
the equivalence between Bayes correlated equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium for canonical
finite games and arbitrary information structures (see Theorem 1 there). The above proposition
specializes the proof to an environment with linear best responses and symmetrically normally
distributed payoff shocks and actions.
We will discuss specific information structures and their associated equilibrium behavior in
Section 7. Here, we describe a one-dimensional class of signals that is already suffi ciently rich to
“decentralize” the entire set of Bayes correlated equilibria as Bayes Nash equilibria. For this, we
enlarge the set of noise free structures studied in Section 3 by allowing the weights on ∆θi and θ̄ to
have different signs, and adding noise:
si = λ∆θi + (1− |λ|)θ̄ + εi, (35)
where λ ∈ [−1, 1] and εi is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ε.3 Similarly to the
definition of the payoff shocks, the individual error term εi can have a common and an idiosyncratic
component, respectively:
ε̄ , Ei[εi], ∆εi , εi − ε̄.
3The weight λ on the idiosyncratic shock is now allowed to take on negative values, and thus the weights on the
idiosyncratic and the aggregate shock can have different signs. By expanding the class of information structures
relative to those considered in Section 3, we expand the set of feasible information structures. This permits for
equilibrium correlation structures in which either ρaθ < ραφ or ρaφ < 0.
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and the standard deviation σε > 0 and the correlation coeffi cient ρεε ∈ [0, 1] are the parameters of
the fully specified information structure I = {Ii}i∈[0,1], together with the confounding parameter
λ. We observe that the dimensionality of information structure I, given by (35) and (36), and
thus parametrized by (λ, σε, ρεε), matches the dimensionality of the Bayes correlated equilibrium





Proposition 9 (Informational Decentralization).
The variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a (normal) Bayes correlated equilibrium if and only if there exist
some information structure (λ, σ2ε, ρεε) under which the variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a Bayes Nash
equilibrium.
The class of one-dimensional signals described by (35) is thus rich enough to “informationally
decentralize” in the sense that every Bayes correlated equilibrium distribution can be reproduced
as a Bayes Nash equilibrium distribution for some choice of the parameters (λ, σε, ρεε) that describe
the family of information structures given by (35). This illustrates how the equilibrium conditions
of the Bayes correlated equilibrium, in particular the conditioning in the best response (27) encode
in the joint distribution information that is made explicit by the information structure of the
corresponding Bayes Nash equilibrium.
6.4. The Boundary of Bayes Correlated Equilibria
We characterized the entire set of Bayes correlated equilibria in Proposition 7. The mean and





were restricted by the two inequalities given by (34). We now
provide a characterization of the boundary of the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in terms of the





Definition 3 (Boundary of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium).
The correlation coeffi cients (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) are on the (upper) boundary of the Bayes correlated equi-








aφ) ≥ (ρaθ, ρaφ), and (ρ′aθ, ρ′aφ) 6= (ρaθ, ρaφ).
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We refer to any triple (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) that satisfies the conditions of Definition 3 as an element of
the upper boundary. For any attainable correlation between actions, ρaa, there is no other Bayes




aφ) that achieves a weakly higher correlation with the idiosyncratic
shock ∆θi and the aggregate shock θ, and strictly higher for at least one of the two shocks.
Now, necessary conditions for a triple (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) to be on the boundary of the Bayes correlated
equilibrium set is that both inequalities (34) are satisfied as equalities, and the restriction to the
positive root of the quadratic equations yields the suffi cient condition.
Proposition 10 (Boundary of Bayes Correlated Equilibria).
The correlation coeffi cients (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) form the boundary of the Bayes correlated equilibrium if
and only if




(1− ρθθ)(1− ρaa), ρaφ =
√
ρaaρθθ }. (37)
The boundary of the Bayes correlated equilibria is described by equation (37) which identifies
ρaθ and ρaφ as a function of ρaa for a given composition of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks,
ρθθ. Accordingly, the correlation coeffi cient ρaθ between action ai and shock θi of agent i is the
sum of two roots. The roots arise from the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shock in the agents’
actions and the agents’shocks, ρaaρθθ and (1− ρaa) (1− ρθθ), respectively. The set of attainable
correlations is restricted by the composition of the payoff shocks as (37) depends explicitly on ρθθ.
Figure 2 visualizes the boundary of the equilibrium set in the two-dimensional space of correlation
coeffi cients (ρaa, ρaθ) for different compositions of the shocks, ρθθ. The left panel represents the
case of ρθθ = 1/2 , whereas the right panel represents ρθθ = 1/4 and ρθθ = 3/4. The right panel
illustrates how the composition of the payoff shocks, ρθθ, impacts the relationship between ρaa and
ρaθ relative to the symmetric condition with ρθθ = 1/2.



















Figure 2: The Boundary of the Bayes Correlated Equilibrium Set
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We can decompose the action of each agent in terms of his responsiveness to the idiosyncratic
shock ∆θi and the aggregate shock θ̄, and any residual responsiveness has to be attributed to noise,
see (25). The action ai itself also has an idiosyncratic and an aggregate component as ai = A+∆ai.
The conditional variance of these components of ai can be expressed in terms of the correlation
coeffi cients
(
ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ, ρθθ
)
, which are subject to the restrictions of Proposition 7. By using the














If the components A and ∆ai of the agent’s individual action are completely explained by the
components of the individual payoff shock, θ̄ and ∆θi, then the conditional variance of the action
components, and a fortiori of the action itself, is equal to zero.4 In fact, the above conditional
variances are equal to zero if the inequalities of Proposition 7 are satisfied as equalities.5
This restatement of the conditions for the boundary of the Bayes correlated equilibrium in
terms of zero conditional variance provides a hint as to which information structures might attain
the above boundary of the Bayes correlated equilibrium set as a Bayes Nash equilibrium. After all,
the condition of zero conditional variance says that the action of each agent is completely explained
by variations in the idiosyncratic and aggregate shock. But precisely this property was guaranteed
by the noise free information structures that we considered in Section 3. Indeed, we can now provide
an equivalence result akin to Proposition 8, but this time specialized to the boundary of the Bayes
correlated equilibrium set.
Proposition 11 (Equivalence).
The coeffi cients (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) form a boundary Bayes correlated equilibrium if and only if they form
a noise free Bayes Nash equilibrium for some information structure λ.
The early restriction to noise free information structure in Section 3 may have appeared ad hoc.
Proposition 11 establishes that the noise free information structures are economically significant in
4The matrix of conditional variances, (38), is well-defined only in the joint presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks, that is for ρθθ ∈ (0, 1). For the case of pure idiosyncratic or pure aggregate shocks, ρθθ = 0 or ρθθ = 1, one
of the conditioning terms, θ̄ or ∆θi, has zero variance by definition.
5The negative root of the equality version of (34) also leads to the zero conditional variance. The resulting
correlation coeffi cients could be generated by noise free information structures with λ < 0. But the correlation
coeffi cients are never part of the upper boundary of the Bayes correlated equilibrium set as Footnote 3 indicates.
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that they attain the maximally achievable equilibrium correlations among all possible information
structures. Thus, the boundary of the Bayes correlated equilibria can be informationally decentral-
ized by signals of the form (35) after imposing the requirement that σε = 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], and
hence precisely the one-dimensional noise free information structures investigated in Section 3.
A crucial implication of the characterization of the boundary in terms of the correlation co-
effi cients is that if we seek to identify the equilibrium distribution that maximizes volatility or
dispersion in the economy, then it is without loss of generality to focus on the boundary of the
Bayes correlated equilibrium set. Moreover, by Proposition 11, this means that we can restrict
attention to the class of one-dimensional noise free information structure.
Proposition 12 (Maximal Volatility and Dispersion).
Among all Bayes correlated equilibria, individual volatility, aggregate volatility, and dispersion are
all maximized by a boundary Bayes correlated equilibrium.





should achieve its maximum across all possible Bayes correlated
equilibria somewhere on the boundary. This indicates that the noise free information structures
remain the critical ones if we were to conduct a more comprehensive welfare analysis beyond the
analysis of the second moments here. Notably, an auxiliary result for Proposition 12, Lemma 2 in









that is strictly increasing in ρaθ and weakly increasing in ρaφ, achieves its maximum in the set of
all feasible Bayes correlated equilibria on the boundary of the set. As the conditions of Lemma 2
are silent about the correlation coeffi cient ρaa, we can accommodate strategic environments (and
payoffs and associated objective functions) with either strategic substitutes or complements. Thus,
we conclude that the special class of noise free information structures are indeed the relevant
information structures even if we were to analyze a larger class of welfare functions.
In the discussion following Proposition 7, we argued that the moment restrictions remain nec-
essary conditions even in the absence of any distributional assumptions of normality. Therefore,
we can actually state a stronger version of Proposition 12. Suppose we maintain the assumption of
normality in the payoff shocks, but neither do we require the normality in actions nor the joint nor-
mality in actions and shocks. Then, we would still have the result that the volatility is maximized
by the noise free and normally distributed equilibria of Proposition 12, as the necessary boundary
conditions of the Bayes correlated equilibria given by Proposition 7 are indeed attained by linear
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combinations of the idiosyncratic and the aggregate shocks.6
7. Information Structures and Equilibrium Behavior
We began our analysis with a class of specific information structures (noise free) and then
established that these noise free information structures indeed form the boundary of equilibrium
behavior with respect to all (symmetric normal) information structures. It is usual to assume some
particular, but not noise free, information structure. We now ask how restrictive these commonly
used classes of information structures are with respect to the entire set of feasible equilibrium
behavior. Our purpose here is only to illustrate how assumptions about the information structure
can be restrictive, rather than providing a comprehensive account of all information structure that
appeared in the literature. Our representative examples illustrate subtle implications of restrictions
on the information structure. The specific information structures that we study are a subset of the
following three-dimensional information structures:
Si , {s1i = θi + ε1i , s2i = θ̄ + ε2i , s3i = θ̄ + ε̄3}, (39)
where ε1i , ε
2
i are idiosyncratic noise terms and ε̄
3 is a common noise term, all normally distributed,
independent and with zero mean. This class of information structures appears in the analysis of





of the noise terms. We begin by characterizing the set of feasible correlations when agents only
observe a noisy idiosyncratic signal of their payoff shock θi:7
s1i = θi + ε
1
i ,
and thus we set σ2ε2 = σ
2
ε3 = ∞. This class of signals is frequently used in the literature on
information sharing, see Vives [23] and Raith [18].
Proposition 13 (Noisy Signal of Payoff State).
A set of correlations (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) can be achieved as a Bayes Nash equilibrium with an information
6We conjecture that Proposition 12 holds even more generally in environments without normally distributed payoff
shocks. But in the absence of normally distributed payoff shocks, the associated noise free information structure is
likely to be a nonlinear, rather than linear, function of the shocks.
7We emphasize the fact that conditions (32) and (33) must hold for any signal structure. Thus, by characterizing
the set of feasible correlations, we are characterizing the set of feasible outcomes.
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Figure 3: Feasible BNE correlation coeffi cients with noisy signals about payoff state θi





; ρaφ = ρaθρθθ; ρaa ∈ [0, ρθθ]. (40)
We observe that the set of feasible correlations when the agents receive only a one-dimensional
signal of the form s1i does not depend on the interaction parameter r. In Figure 3 we illustrate the
locus of attainable correlations with information structures {s1i }i∈[0,1] for ρθθ = 1/2. The arrows
point in the direction of greater precision (i.e., lower variance) of the error term. Notably, all the
attainable equilibrium coeffi cients are below the frontier given by the Bayes correlated equilibria,
except for a single point that is identified by zero noise, or σ2ε1 = 0.
Next, we consider information structures in which each agent knows his own payoff shock, and




ε3 ∈ [0,∞). That is, all possible outcomes that are consistent
with each agent knowing at least θi. Since each agent knows his own payoff shock, the residual
uncertainty is with respect to the actions taken by the other players. The informational assumption
that each agent knows his own payoff shock θi commonly appears in the macroeconomics literature.
For example, Angeletos and La’O [2], [3] and Angeletos, Iovino, and La’O [1] consider models with
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks and imperfect information, but assume that each agent knows
his own payoff shock θi. In a model with idiosyncratic rather than aggregate interaction, Angeletos
and La’O [4] analyze the impact of informational friction on aggregate fluctuations. Again, they
assume that each agent knows his own payoff shock θi, but is uncertain about the payoff shock
θj of the trading partner j. Similarly, Lorenzoni [13] investigates the optimal monetary policy
with dispersed information. He also considers a form of individual matching rather than aggregate
interaction. The informational assumption common to all of these models is that every agent i
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knows his own payoff shock θi, and thus all uncertainty is purely strategic.
The characterization of the set of attainable equilibrium correlations is achieved in two steps.
First, we describe the set of feasible action correlations ρaa. If each agent only knows his own
payoff shock θi, then the correlation ρaa is equal to ρθθ as the actions of any two agents can only
be correlated to the extent that their payoff shocks are correlated. By contrast, if the agents have
complete information, then the correlation is given by ρaa = ρ̂aa,
ρ̂aa ,
ρθθ
(1− ρθθ) (1− r)
2 + ρθθ
, (41)
where ρ̂aa is the correlation that is achieved by the information structure λ̂ that recovers the
equilibrium moments of the complete information Nash equilibrium, see (24).
We find that the set of feasible action correlations is always between these two quantities, ρθθ
and ρ̂aa, providing the lower and upper bound. If r > 0, then the complete information bound is
the upper bound, if r < 0, it is the lower bound. For r = 0 they coincide as θi is a suffi cient statistic
of the action taken by each agent under complete information.
Second, we describe the set of feasible correlations between action and individual payoff shock,
ρaθ, for any feasible ρaa. The set of feasible ρaθ is determined by two functions of ρaa, which provide
the lower and upper bound for the feasible ρaθ. We denote these functions by ρ
i
aθ (ρaa) and ρ
c
aθ (ρaa)
as these bounds are achieved by information structures in which each agent knows his own payoff
shock and receives a second signal, either an idiosyncratic signal of the aggregate shock θ̄ : s2i , θ̄+ε2i
or a common signal of θ̄ : s3i , θ̄ + ε̄3.
Proposition 14 (Known Payoff State θi).
A set of correlations (ρaa, ρaθ) can be induced by a linear Bayes Nash equilibrium in which each
agent knows his payoff shock θi if and only if
ρaa ∈ [min{ρ̂aa, ρθθ},max{ρ̂aa, ρθθ}]; (42)
and for any ρaa satisfying (42):
ρaθ ∈ [min{ρcaθ (ρaa) , ρiaθ (ρaa)},max{ρcaθ (ρaa) , ρiaθ (ρaa)}].
In Figure 4, we illustrate the Bayes Nash equilibrium set for different values of r for a given
correlation ρθθ = 1/2. Each interaction value r is represented by a differently colored pair of lower
and upper bounds. For each value of r, the entire set of Bayes Nash equilibria is given by the area
enclosed by the lower and upper bounds. Notably, the bounds ρcaθ (ρaa) and ρ
i
aθ (ρaa) intersect in
two points, corresponding to each agent knowing his payoff shock θi only (at ρaa = ρθθ = 1/2) and
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to complete information, at the low or high end of ρaa depending on the nature of the interaction,
respectively. In fact these, and only these, two points, are also boundary points of the unrestricted
set of Bayes correlated equilibria. When r ≥ 0, the upper bound is given by a signal with an
idiosyncratic error term, s2i , while the lower bound is given by a signal with a common error term,
s3i , and conversely for r ≤ 0.
Thus, if each agent knows at least his own payoff shock, then we observe a dramatic reduction
in the set of feasible Bayes Nash equilibria. Notably, every element, with the exception of the
information structures mentioned in the above paragraph, are in the interior of the unrestricted set
of Bayes correlated equilibria. Moreover, the nature of the interaction has a profound impact on
the set of correlations (ρaa, ρaθ) that can arise in equilibrium, both in terms of its size as well as its
location in the unit square.












Figure 4: Boundary of the set of feasible correlations when agents know own payoff (ρθθ = 1/2)
If each agent i is assumed to know his payoff shock θi, then we can restate the best response
condition (4) with respect to ai after the following change of variables in terms of deviations from
the payoff shock:
ãi , ai − θi, Ã , A− θ. (43)











where Ii is any information agent i gets beyond knowing θi. The resulting best response condition
is now isomorphic to one where there are only aggregate shocks, and where the payoff shock and
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average action receive the same weight in the best response condition of the individual agent. This
provides a distinct intuition on the strong restrictions on behavior that arise from imposing that
agents know their own payoff shock as stated in Proposition 14.
In the supplemental online material, we analyze a third subset of information structure, in which,
besides the noisy signal {s1i }i∈[0,1], each player also knows the aggregate shock θ, thus σ2ε2 = σ2ε3 = 0.
Although a priori this may not seem like an information structure that would arise exogenously, it
is the information structure that arises when agents receive endogenous information on the average
action taken by other players, such as in a rational expectations equilibrium with a continuum of
sellers as studied by Vives [25] or Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris [7]. In the supplemental online
material, we characterize the entire set of equilibrium correlations that can be achieved with the
three-dimensional structures defined by (39). Surprisingly then the above class of three-dimensional
information structures Si fails to decentralize the entire set of Bayes correlated equilibria. By
contrast, in the case of pure aggregate shocks Bergemann and Morris [8] show that any Bayes
correlated equilibrium can be decentralized by considering a private and a public signal of the




i = θ̄ + ε̄
3.
8. Discussion
We conclude by discussing the relevance of the current analysis to environments with heteroge-
neous rather than aggregate interaction. We end by relating our analysis to the large literature on
information sharing among firms and suggest how the current tools might yield new results there
as well.
Beyond Aggregate Interaction. We deliberately restricted our analysis to an environment with ag-
gregate interaction. Every agent formed a best response against the average of the population. Yet,
within the linear quadratic framework, it appears feasible to extend the analysis to much richer
interaction structures, such as pairwise interaction or even general network interaction structures.
In the macroeconomics literature, models of heterogenous interactions have appeared prominently,
for example, in Lorenzoni [13] and Angeletos and La’O [4]. Notably, these models of pairwise inter-
action assume that each agent knows his own payoff shock θi but is still uncertain about the payoff
shocks of other agents. As each agent i knows his own payoff shock θi, there is no payoff uncertainty
anymore and so the residual uncertainty is all about the strategic uncertainty, namely the action of
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the other agent. 8
Interestingly, even if we were interested in strategic uncertainty in the absence of payoff uncer-
tainty, the noise free information structures remain of central importance for the aggregate behavior.
To see this, consider a simple model of pairwise interaction as in Angeletos and La’O [4]. We assume
there is pairwise matching between i and j and that agents interact with their partner, ra, as well
as with the aggregate population, rA. Thus, the first order condition of agent i’s problem when he
is matched with j is given by:
ai = E [θi |θi, Ii ] + raE [aj |θi, Ii ] + rAE [A |θi, Ii ] .
If we make the same change of variables as earlier in (43), so that we express the choice variables
in terms of their deviation from the payoff shock: ãi , ai − θi, Ã , A − θ, then the associated
first order conditions are given by:









Thus, we have a similar model as the one we have been studying so far, but with some differences.
First, agents have some prior information on θ̄ which comes from knowing θi. Second, the size of the
shocks ∆θj and θ̄ are scaled by ra and rA, respectively, in the first order conditions. Besides these
differences, a model with heterogeneous interaction in which each agent knows his own payoff shock
is almost identical to our original model. Namely, each agent’s uncertainty is still two-dimensional,
with an aggregate and an idiosyncratic shock (equal to θ̄ and ∆θj respectively). Thus, we see
that even if we were interested in strategic uncertainty in the absence of fundamental uncertainty,
the same basic intuitions and ideas would still apply. A key factor to consider would be to see
how the signal leads each agent to be confuses about ∆θj and θ̄. And as before, the confounding
of the information would lead to overreaction and underreaction to some of these fundamentals,
respectively. Thus, the pairwise interaction, or any other richer interaction structure, enriches the
set of feasible outcomes and partially reverses the restrictions that come with the informational
assumptions of knowing the individual payoff states that we earlier established in Proposition 14.
Information Sharing. We described the impact that the private information structure has on the
second moments of the economy, in particular the volatility of the aggregate outcome. Naturally,
8We thank our discussant, Marios Angeletos, for emphasizing the importance of the distinct contribution of each
source of uncertainty to the aggregate volatility.
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Figure 5: Information Sharing under Public and Private Disclosure Rules
we could expand the analysis to functions of the (second) moments of the economy. In the large
literature on information sharing among firms, pioneered in work by Novshek and Sonnenschein
[17], Clarke [10] and Vives [22], the expected profit function of the individual firm is a function of
the volatility both of the individual and the aggregate outcome. In this class of models which is
presented in a very general framework by Raith [18] and surveyed by Vives [24], each firm receives
a private signal about a source of uncertainty, say a demand or cost shock. The central question
is under which conditions the firms have an incentive to commit ex-ante to an agreement to share
information in some form. The present analysis of the impact of information structures on the set of
feasible correlations suggests novel insights into the nature of optimal information sharing policies.
We briefly illustrate this within a competitive equilibrium with a continuum of producers, each
one of them with a quadratic cost of production c (ai) = a2i /2, and facing a linear inverse demand





so that the resulting best response function is again given by (4).9 We can depict the iso-profit curve







in the space of the correlation coeffi cients (ρaa, ρaθ). The iso-profit curve π can be shown to be
linear in ρaa, as indicated by the red dashed line in Figure 5, and the slope is determined by the
responsiveness r of the price to supply.
The maximal correlation ρaθ that is achievable with disclosure of a common signal, denoted
9The restriction to the pure aggregate shock environment, θi = θ, allows us to directly use arguments in Bergemann
and Morris [8], in particular Proposition 8, but the insights naturally extend to the environment with idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks.
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earlier in Proposition 14 by ρcaθ (ρaa), is convex in ρaa, whereas the maximal correlation achievable
with disclosure of an idiosyncratic signal is given by ρiaθ (ρaa) ,
√
ρaa, and is concave in ρaa. In fact
with aggregate shocks only, the idiosyncratic signals s1i = θ+εi trace out the entire boundary of the
Bayes correlated equilibrium coeffi cients, as illustrated in Figure 5. We therefore can conclude that
the optimal disclosure policy with a public signal is either zero or complete disclosure, which was a
central finding in Kirby [12], Vives [23] and Raith [18].10 By contrast, the optimal disclosure policy
of a private signal depends on r and can be noisy. The iso-profit curve generates a linear trade-off
in the correlations of the individual supply decision ai and the demand shock θ. A better match
with the level of aggregate demand increases profit, but a better match with the supply of the other
firms decreases the profit. With public disclosure of a noisy signal si, the convexity in the trade-off
leads to either zero disclosure or complete disclosure of the aggregate information. With private
disclosure, the trade-off is resolved in favor of a better match with the demand shock without an
undue increase in the correlation of the supply decisions. Thus, we find that the industry-wide
preferred disclosure policy frequently involves partial disclosure of information, by which disclosure
is noisy and idiosyncratic, as opposed to the bang-bang solution that was previously obtained
in the literature under the (implicit) restriction to public disclosure policies. Thus we find that a
common and hence perfectly correlated disclosure policy is (always) weakly and (sometimes) strictly
dominated by a private and hence imperfectly correlated disclosure policy.
We can rephrase this insight in terms of the macroeconomic language. An idiosyncratic "sen-
timent" shock may be needed to generate the largest individual volatility in the aggregate shock
environment, just as a common "sentiment" shocks is necessary to generate the largest volatility in
the idiosyncratic shock environment of Angeletos and La’O [4]. The analysis in Section 7 suggests
that the above results for the pure aggregate shock environment (and similarly for the pure idio-
syncratic shock) extend to the general environment with idiosyncratic as well as aggregate shocks.
We leave a more comprehensive analysis for future research.
10In Section 8.4 of Vives [24], the design of the optimal information sharing policy in a large market with a
continuum of agents is posed as the problem of a mediator who elicits and then transmits the collected information
to the agents. The analysis is thus close to the present perspective of the Bayes correlated equilibrium, but also




The Appendix A collects the omitted proofs from the main body of the text. The supplementary
online material contains the Appendices B and C, which have additional results regarding the
restrictions that information structures impose on the equilibrium behavior, complementing the
results of Section 7 of the main paper.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the actions of players must be measurable with respect to si, in
any linear strategy the actions of players must be given by ai = w(λ)si + ν, where ν and w(λ) are
constants. Thus A = w(λ)((1− λ)θ̄) + ν. Thus, we must have that:
ai = w(λ)si + ν = E[r(w(λ)((1− λ)θ̄) + ν) + θi|si].
By taking expectations and using the law of iterated expectations, we get:
w(λ)(1− λ)µθ + ν = rw(λ)((1− λ)µθ + ν) + µθ.
Using that µθ = 0, we get that ν = 0. Thus, we know that ai = w(λ)((1 − λ)θ̄ + λ∆θi) and
A = w(λ)(1 − λ)θ̄. Multiplying by ai we get: a2i = E[rAai + θiai|si], and appealing to the law of
iterated expectations we get:
w(λ)((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ)) = ((1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ)),
and solving for w(λ) yields the expression in (11). The uniqueness of the Bayes Nash equilibrium
is established in Ui and Yoshizawa [19]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. By using the law of iterated expectations we obtain µa = µA =





2 var(si) = w(λ)
2((1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))σ2θ,
thus we get (12). Similarly, we obtain:
var(A) = cov(ai, aj) = ρaaσ
2
a = w(λ)
2E[((1− λ)θ̄ + λ∆θi)((1− λ)θ̄ + λ∆θj)] = w(λ)2(1− λ)2ρθθσ2θ,
and
cov(ai, θi) = ρaθσaσθ = w(λ)E[((1− λ)θ̄ + λ∆θi)θi] = w(λ)((1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ))σ2θ,
which establishes the result. 
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(1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ)
(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ)
)2
(1− λ)2ρθθ.
The solution (17) follows from Proposition 6. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Given a noise free equilibrium parametrized by λ we have that:
cov(ai, θ̄) = w(λ)(1− λ)θ̄ =
((1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ))
((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
(1− λ)θ̄,
cov(ai,∆θi) = w(λ)λ∆θi =
((1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ))
((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
λ∆θi.
But, note that if λ < λ̂, then λ
(1−r) < (1− λ), but then
cov(ai,∆θi) =
((1− λ)ρθθλ+ λ2(1− ρθθ))
((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
∆θi
≥ ((1− λ)
2(1− r)ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
= 1,
with strict inequality if λ > λ̂. Thus, the response to the idiosyncratic shock is greater than in the
complete information equilibrium if λ ∈ (λ̂, 1). For the second part we repeat the same argument.
Note that if λ < λ̂, then λ < (1− λ)(1− r), but then:
cov(ai, θ̄) =
((1− λ)2ρθθ + (1− λ)λ(1− ρθθ))




((1− λ)2(1− r)ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))




with strict inequality if λ < λ̂. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The comparative statics with respect to the argmax are shown by
proving that the quantities have a unique maximum, which is interior, and then use the sign of the
cross derivatives (the derivative with respect to λ and r). The ordering of the information structures
that maximizes the different second moments is proved by comparing the derivatives.
(2.) We begin by rewriting the individual variance, and using (12) we can write it in terms of
λ:
σ2a = (
((1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ))
((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
)2((1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))σ2θ
= ρθθ
(1 + yx)2













Note that x is strictly increasing in λ, and if λ ∈ [0, 1] then x ∈ [0,∞], and thus maximizing with




= −2(xy + 1) (x
3 + (2r − 1)yx2 + (r + 1)x− (1− r)y)
(x2 + 1− r)3
σ2θ.




is positive at x = 0 and negative if we take a x large enough, and thus the
maximum must be in x ∈ (0,∞). We would like to show that the polynomial:(
x3 + (2r − 1)yx2 + (r + 1)x− (1− r)y
)
,
has a unique root in x ∈ (0,∞). If r < −1, then the function is increasing in x and has a negative
value at x = 0, thus it has a unique root. If x > 1/2, then the function is negative and decreasing at
x. Since it is a cubic polynomial and the term next to x3 is positive, it must have a unique positive
root. For r ∈ [−1, 1/2] we define the determinant of the cubic equation:
∆ = 18abcd− 4b3d+ b2c2 − 4ac3 − 27a2d2.
We know that if ∆ < 0 then the polynomial has a unique root. Replacing by the respective values
of the cubic polynomial we get:
∆ = 4y4(2r − 1)3(1− r) + y2((2r − 1)2(1 + r)2 − 18(1− r2)(2r − 1)− 27(1− r)2))− 4(1 + r)3,
using the fact that for r ∈ [−1, 1/2] we have that (2r − 1) ≤ 0 and 1 + r ≥ 0, we know that the
term with y4 and without y are negative. We just need to check the term with y2, but this is also
negative for r ∈ [−1, 1/2]. Thus, ∆ < 0, and thus for r ∈ [−1, 1/2] the polynomial has a unique
root.











((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
< 0,
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((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
< 0,
and thus argmaxλ σ2a is decreasing in r.
Next, we consider the aggregate variance ρaaσ
2




((1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ))
((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
)2(1− λ)2ρθθσ2θ = ρθθ
(1 + yx)2
((1− r) + x2)2σ
2
θ, (47)
where x and y are defined as in (46). Maximizing with respect to x ∈ [0,∞] is equivalent to





= −2(xy + 1) (2x+ (x
2 + r − 1) y)
(x2 + 1− r)3
σ2θ. (48)
Again, we have that (2x+ (x2 + r − 1) y) has a unique root in (0,∞) Thus, we have that there
exists a unique λ that maximizes ρaaσ
2















((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
< 0,
and thus at the maximum ∂
2σ2a
∂r∂λ
< 0, and thus argmaxλ ρaaσ
2
a is decreasing in r.
Finally, we consider the dispersion, (1− ρaa)σ2a, expressed in terms of λ:
(1− ρaa)σ2a = (
((1− λ)ρθθ + λ(1− ρθθ))




((1− r) + x2)2x
2σ2θ,
where x and y are defined in (46). As before, maximizing with respect to x ∈ [0,∞] is equivalent
to maximizing with respect to λ ∈ [0, 1]. Finding the derivative we get:
∂(1− ρaa)σ2a
∂x
= −2x(xy + 1) (x
2 + 2(r − 1)yx+ r − 1)
(x2 + 1− r)3
σ2θ.
Again, we have that (x2 + 2(r − 1)yx+ r − 1) has a unique root in (0,∞) Thus, there exists a












((1− r)(1− λ)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ))
< 0,
and thus at the maximum ∂
2σ2a
∂r∂λ
< 0, and thus argmaxλ (1− ρaa)σ2a is decreasing in r.
(1.) Finally, we want to show that argmaxλ (1 − ρaa)σ2a > argmaxλ σ2a > argmaxλ ρaaσ2a.
These inequalities follows from comparing the derivatives of (1− ρaa)σ2a, σ2a and ρaaσ2a with respect












Since the derivatives satisfy the previous inequalities, and the quantities have a unique maximum,
the argument of the maximum must also satisfy the same inequalities.
(3.) The comparative static results with respect to the maximum follow directly from the
envelope theorem. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We first solve for maxλ{ρaaσ2a}. By setting (48) equal to 0, we have
that the aggregate volatility is maximized at,
x =
√
1 + y2(1− r)− 1
y
.






+ r + r − 2
)
(r − 4)ρθθ + 1
.
Substituting the solution in (47) and using the definitions of x and y we get that the maximum






ρθθ + (1− r)(1− ρθθ))2
.
Using the definition of σθ̄ and σ
2
θ we get (26). Note that by imposing r = 0 we also get (17) and
(18). 
















{ρaaσ2a} = σ2θ̄/(1− r)
2.
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and hence we get the result. 
Proof of Lemma 1. We need to prove that given the assumption of symmetry, the parame-
ters (µa, ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ, σa) are suffi cient to characterize the distribution of the random variables
(θi, θ̄, ai, A). Clearly, we have that µa = µA, as it follows from the law of iterated expectations.
By the previous definition (and decomposition) of the idiosyncratic shock θi, we observe that the
expectations of the following products all agree: Ei[aiθ̄] = Ei[Aθθi] = Ei[Aθ̄]. This can be easily
seen as follows:
E[θiA] = E[θ̄A] + E[∆θiA] = E[θ̄A] + E[A · E[∆θi|A]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
] = E[θ̄A],
where we just use the law of iterated expectations and the fact that the expected value of a idio-
syncratic variable conditioned on an aggregate variable must be 0. Thus:
cov(ai, θ̄) = cov(A, θi) = cov(A, θ̄) = cov(ai, θj) = E[aiθj]− µaµθ = ρaφσθσa.
Similarly, since we consider a symmetric Bayes correlated equilibrium, the covariance of the actions
of any two individuals, ai and aj, which is denoted by ρaaσ
2
a, is equal to the aggregate variance.
Once again, this can be easily seen as follows,
E[aiaj] = E[A2] + E[A∆aj] + E[∆aiA] + E[∆ai∆aj] = E[A2],
where in this case we need to use that the equilibrium is symmetric and thus E[∆ai∆aj] = 0. Thus,
we have σ2A = cov(ai, aj) = cov(A, ai) = ρaaσ
2
a. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The moment equalities (1) and (2) were established in (30) and
(31). Thus we proceed to verify that the inequality constraints (3) are necessary and suffi cient to
guarantee that the matrix V is positive semidefinite.
Here we express the equilibrium conditions, by a change of variables, in terms of different
variables, which facilitates the calculation. Let:
M ,

1 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 1
 .
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σaσθ 0 (1− ρaa)σ2a 0




We use V⊥ to denote the variance/covariance matrix expressed in terms of (∆θi, θ̄,∆ai, A). It is easy
to verify that V⊥ is positive semidefinite if and only if the inequality conditions (3) are satisfied.
To check this it is suffi cient to note that the leading principal minors are positive if and only if
these conditions are satisfied, and thus V⊥ is positive semidefinite if and only if these conditions
are satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 8. (⇐) We first prove that if the variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a Bayes
Nash equilibrium for some information structure Ii (and associated signals), then the variables
(θi, θ̄, ai, A) also form a Bayes correlated equilibrium. Consider the case in which agents receive
normally distributed signals through the information structure Ii, which by minor abuse of notation
also serves as conditioning event. Then in any Bayes Nash equilibrium of the game, we have that
the actions of the agents are given by:
ai = rE[A|Ii] + E[θi|Ii], ∀i,∀Ii, (50)
and since the information is normally distributed, the variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) are jointly normal as
well. By taking the expectation of (50) conditional on the information set I ′i = {Ii, ai} we get:
E[ai|Ii, ai] = ai = rE[E[A|Ii]|Ii, ai] + E[E[θi|Ii]|Ii, ai]
= rE[A|Ii, ai] + E[θi|Ii, ai]. (51)
In other words, agents know the recommended action they are supposed to take, and thus, we can
assume that the agents condition on their own actions. By taking expectations of (51) conditional
on {ai} we get:
E[ai|ai] = ai = rE[E[A|Ii, ai]|ai] + E[E[θi|Ii, ai]|ai]
= rE[A|ai] + E[θi|ai], (52)
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where we used the law of iterated expectations. In other words, the information contained in {ai}
is a suffi cient statistic for agents to compute their best response, and thus the agents compute the
same best response if they know {Ii, ai} or if they just know {ai}. Yet, looking at (52), by definition
(θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a Bayes correlated equilibrium.
(⇒) We now prove that if (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a Bayes correlated equilibrium, then there exists an
information structure Ii such that the variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a Bayes Nash equilibrium when
agents receive this information structure. We consider the case in which the variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A)
form a Bayes correlated equilibrium, and thus the variables are jointly normal and
ai = rE[A|ai] + E[θi|ai]. (53)
Since the variables are jointly normal we can always find w ∈ R and λ ∈ [−1, 1], such that:
ai = w(λ∆θi + (1− |λ|)θ̄ + εi).






















= (λ∆θi + (1− λ)θ̄ + εi). (54)
Then, by definition, we have that:
ai = wsi = rE[A|ai] + E[θi|ai] = rE[A|si] + E[θi|si],
where we use the fact that conditioning on ai is equivalent to conditioning on si. Thus, when agent
i receives information structure (and associated signal si): Ii = {si}, then agent i taking action
ai = wsi constitutes a Bayes Nash equilibrium, as it complies with the best response condition.
Thus, the distribution (θi, θ̄, ai, A) forms a Bayes Nash equilibrium when agents receive signals
Ii = {si}. 
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Proof of Proposition 9. Note that (54) has the form stated in the Proposition, and thus this
was implicitly established by the proof of Proposition 8. 
To establish Proposition 12, we use the following lemma that is of independent interest. Consider
an arbitrary continuous function:
ψ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [−1, 1]→ R,
whose domain is given by the triple of correlation coeffi cients: (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ).
Lemma 2.
If ψ(ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) is a continuous function, strictly increasing in ρaθ and weakly increasing in ρaφ,
then the Bayes correlated equilibrium that maximizes ψ is an noise free Bayes correlated equilibrium.
Proof. By rewriting the constraints (34) of Proposition 7 we obtain:
1. ρθθρaa − (ρaφ)2 ≥ 0;
2. (1− ρaa)(1− ρθθ)− (ρaθ − ρaφ)2 ≥ 0.
If ψ(ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) is strictly increasing, then in the optimum the above inequality (2) must bind.
Moreover, if the constraint (1) does not bind, then we can just increase ρaθ and ρaφ in equal amounts,
without violating (2) and increasing the value of ψ. Thus, in the maximum of ψ we must have that
both bind.
Proof of Proposition 10. First, it is easy to see that for any coeffi cients (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) in
the boundary, we must have that that both inequalities in (34) must be satisfied with equality.
Otherwise, we could always increase ρaθ and ρaφ in the right amounts without breaking either
inequality, and thus achieving a higher value of ρaθ. Second, it is easy to solve for ρaθ in terms of





(1− ρaa)(1− ρθθ)| and ρaφ = ±
√
ρaaρθθ.






as this gives the maximum value for ρaθ.
Proof of Proposition 11. From Proposition 10, we must have that both inequalities in (34)
must be satisfied with equality. From (38) it is clear that if both inequalities in (34) are satisfied
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with equality, then ai must be deterministic conditional on ∆θi and θ̄. Moreover, give the properties
of multivariate normal distributions, we must have that ai is a linear combination of ∆θi and θ̄.
Thus, without loss of generality, for any coeffi cients (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) in the boundary, we must have
that:
ai = w(λ)((1− |λ|)θ̄ + λ∆θi) with λ ∈ [−1, 1]. (55)
This comes from the fact that we can calculate the outcome of the Bayes correlated equilibrium as
the outcome of a Bayes Nash equilibrium when agents get signals of the form (35), with σ2ε = 0.




(1− |λ|)2ρθθ + λ2(1− ρθθ)
.
Finally, for any λ ∈ [0, 1] we have that the correlation of players action for information structure
−λ yields the same correlation of action as information structure λ, but strictly lower correlation
between action and payoff state, ρaθ. Thus, all noise free information structures with λ ∈ (−1, 0)
cannot be in the boundary as they yield strictly lower ρaθ than noise free information structures with
λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, all Bayes correlated equilibrium on the boundary form a Bayes Nash equilibrium
with a noise free information structure with λ ∈ [0, 1].
On the other hand, all Bayes Nash equilibrium with a noise free information structure with
λ ∈ [0, 1] form a Bayes correlated equilibrium on the boundary. This just come from the fact that
actions in Bayes Nash equilibrium with a noise free information structure are linear combination







with ρaa ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 12. From (33) the individual volatility, aggregate volatility and dispersion










and the result follows directly.
Proof of Proposition 13. See supplemental online appendix.
Proof of Proposition 14. See supplemental online appendix.
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Abstract
This supplement to ”Information and Volatility” contains auxiliary material and proofs to the
results found in the main paper.
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This supplement of Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris [4] contains Appendices B and C of our
paper “Information and Volatility”. Appendix A is found in the main paper.
Supplementary Appendices
B. Additional Results regarding Information Structures and Equilibrium Behavior, complementing
the results in Section 7 of the main paper.
C. Proofs for the Additional Results of Appendix B.
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Appendix B:
Additional Results for Section 7: Information Structures and Equilibrium Behavior
A third interesting information structure, next to those investigated in Section 7, is the case
in which, besides signal {s1i }i∈[0,1], the players also know the average payoff state θ, and thus we
set σ2ε2 = σ
2
ε3 = 0, and each agent observes θ̄ and s
1
i . Although a priori this may not seem like an
information structure that would arise exogenously, it is the information structure that arises when
agents receive endogenous information on the average action taken by other players. For example,
in a rational expectations equilibrium with a continuum of sellers as studied by Vives [6], each seller
chooses a supply function, given a signal about his private cost θi. The resulting equilibrium price
p can be shown to be a linear function of the average supply, and in turn a linear function of the
average cost θ. Similarly, in recent work by Benhabib, Wang, and Wen [1], (2013) and Bergemann,
Heumann, and Morris [3] the equilibrium condition of the rational expectations equilibrium has a
linear structure in which each agent conditions his decision on the common component θ.
Proposition 15 (Noisy Signal of Payoff State / Noiseless Signal of Common Component).
A set of correlations (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) can be achieved as a Bayes Nash equilibrium with an information









ρθθρaa; ρaa ∈ [ρ̂aa, 1]. (56)




generates a two-dimensional signal for every agent i. We also find that the correlation coefficient
ρaa has a lower bound, which is the correlation coefficient ρ̂aa achieved in the complete informa-
tion equilibrium. In Figure 6 we illustrate the set of correlations that can be achieved when each
agent receives a noisy signal s1i of his payoff state θi, and in addition knows the average payoff
state θ. We observe that the class of two-dimensional information structures {s1i , θ}i∈[0,1] induces
a one-dimensional subspace of (ρaθ, ρaa) that does depend on the nature of the interaction. Indeed
Proposition 15 establishes that these signals maintain a one-dimensional subspace even with re-
spect to the full three dimensional space of correlation coefficients (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ). Importantly, the
feasible correlation coefficients remained bounded away from the frontier, except for the two points
of σ2ε1 = 0 and σ
2
ε1 = ∞, where the later leads to perfect correlation in the actions across agents:
ρaa = 1, at the expense of low correlation with the payoff state: ρaθ =
√
ρθθ.
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Figure 6: Set of feasible correlations for subset of information structures ( ρθθ = 1/2)
So far, we confined attention to strict subsets of the three-dimensional information structures







σε1 ∈ [0,∞) ∈ [0,∞) 0
σε2 ∞ 0 ∈ [0,∞)
σε3 ∞ 0 ∈ [0,∞)
Proposition 13 15 14
Table 1: Information as Restriction on Equilibrium Behavior
Now that we understand how the observability of the individual state or components of the
individual state affect the equilibrium correlation, we can ask what is the entire set of equilibrium
correlations that can be achieved with the three dimensional signal structure. As the dimension-
ality of the information structure defined by (39) coincides with the dimensionality of the set of
equilibrium correlations, one might expect that the set of information structures is sufficiently rich
to span the set of equilibria defined by the BCE. In fact, in the case of pure common values Berge-
mann and Morris [5] show that any BCE can be decentralized by considering a private and a public




i = θ̄ + ε̄
3. By contrast, in the present general
environment neither the class of binary nor the extended class of tertiary information structures can
decentralize the entire sets of BCE. We characterize the set of feasible correlations in the (ρaa, ρaθ)
coefficient space. In order to describe the set of feasible correlations in the (ρaa, ρaθ) space, we define
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ρaθ(ρaa) to be the upper bound that can be attained by the correlation coefficient ρaa in a Bayes
Nash equilibrium with an information structure in the set defined by (39).
Proposition 16 (Boundary of Correlations under Si).
The boundary of feasible correlations ρaθ(ρaa) for Bayes Nash equilibria when the information struc-
ture is in si is given by:
1. If ρaa ∈ [0,min{ρ̂aa, ρθθ}], then ρaθ(ρaa) is attained by an information structure in which




2. If ρaa ∈ [min{ρ̂aa, ρθθ},max{ρ̂aa, ρθθ}], then ρaθ(ρaa) is attained by an information structure
in which each agent knows his own payoff state: σε1 = 0, σε2 , σε3 ∈ [0,∞) with ρaθ(ρaa) =
max{ρcaθ, ρiaθ}.
3. If ρaa ∈ [max{ρ̂aa, ρθθ}, 1], then ρaθ(ρaa) is attained by an information structure in which each








The upper bound ρaθ (ρaa) can therefore be constructed from the union of the information
structures that we considered in Propositions 13, 14 and 15. In Figure 7, the left panel illustrates
the behavior that can be achieved for r = 0. In this special case, the correlation coefficient of
the complete information equilibrium ρ̂aa coincides with the correlation coefficient of the payoff
states ρθθ, and hence min{ρ̂aa, ρθθ} = max{ρ̂aa, ρθθ}. Thus the entire boundary can be achieved by
noisy and idiosyncratic signals of the payoff state θi with either zero or complete information about
the common component θ, appealing to Propositions 16.1 and 16.3 respectively. The right panel
illustrates the Proposition for r 6= 0. As stated earlier in Proposition 14, the intermediate segment
of the boundary is obtained with a noisy signal of the common components that comes with a
common error in the case of strategic substitutes: σε1 = σε2 =∞, σε3 ∈ [0,∞); or an idiosyncratic
error in the case of strategic complements: σε1 = σε3 =∞, σε2 ∈ [0,∞). Using positive variances of
the error terms, it is easy to show that for all (ρaa, ρaθ) such that ρaθ ∈ [0, ρaθ(ρaa)], there exists an
information structure in the set si that achieves theses correlations as a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
A common feature across all strategic environments is the property that the boundary ρaθ is
strictly below the frontier of all Bayes correlated equilibria, which implies that the set of three-
dimensional information structures given by (39) is indeed restrictive. We find that the boundary
ρaθ attains the frontier of the BCE at exactly three points: (i) the complete information equilibrium,
(ii) the equilibrium in which each agent knows θi and (iii) the equilibrium in which each agent only
knows θ̄. It is perhaps worth highlighting that the boundary ρaθ is discontinuous for strategic
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substitutes, that is r < 0. This result emphasizes the subtle role that the information structure has
on equilibrium outcomes.



























Figure 7: Boundary of the set of feasible correlations for information structures si (ρθθ = 1/2)
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Appendix C:
Proofs for Section 7 and the Additional Results of Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 13. The action of agent i is given by ai = νs
1
i = ν(θi + εi), for some



















































From the above equalities it follows directly that (40) is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 14. From the best response conditions, we have that, ai = θi +
rE[A|Ii], and multiplying by θi and taking expectations (note that because θi is in Ii, we have that
θiE[A|Ii] = E[θiA|Ii]), we find that ρaθσa = σθ + rρaφσa. We use the fact that σa = ρaθσθ + rρaaσa,








Thus, the inequalities in (34) can be written as follows:














For both of the previous inequalities the right hand side is a convex function of ρaθ. Thus, for a
fixed ρaa, inequalities (58) and (59) independently constrain the set of feasible ρaθ to be in a convex
interval with non-empty interior for all ρaa ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, if we impose both inequalities jointly,
we find the intersection of both intervals which is also a convex interval. We first find the set of
feasible ρaa and prove that it is always case that one of the inequalities provides the lower bound
and the other inequality provides the upper bound on the set of feasible ρaθ for each feasible ρaa.
For this we make several observations.
First, when agents know their own payoff state there are only two noise free equilibria, one
in which agents know only their state and the complete information equilibria. This implies that
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there are only two pairs of values for (ρaa, ρaθ) such that inequalities (58) and (59) both hold with
equality. Second, the previous point implies that there are only two pairs of values for (ρaa, ρaθ)
such that the bound of the intervals imposed by inequalities (58) and (59) are the same. Third,
the previous two points imply that there are only two possible ρaa such that the set of feasible
ρaθ is a singleton. These values are ρaa ∈ {ρθθ, ρ̂aa}, which corresponds to the ρaa of the complete
information equilibria and the equilibria in which agents only know their state. Fourth, it is clear
that there are no feasible BCE with ρaa ∈ {0, 1}. Fifth, the upper and lower bound on the feasible
ρaθ that are imposed by inequalities (58) and (59) move smoothly with ρaa. Sixth, this implies that
the set of feasible ρaa is bounded by the values of ρaa in which the set of feasible ρaθ is a singleton.
Thus, the set of feasible ρaa is in [min{ρθθ, ρ̂aa},max{ρθθ, ρ̂aa}]. Moreover, it is easy to see that for
all ρaa in the interior of this interval one of the inequalities provides the upper bound for ρaθ while
the other inequality will provide the lower bound.
We now provide the explicit functional forms for the upper and lower bounds. To check which of
the inequalities provides the upper and lower bound respectively we can just look at the equilibria















It is easy to check that ρaθ = 1 satisfies both inequalities. Moreover, it is easy to see that if r > 0
then ρaθ = 1 provides a lower bound on the set of ρaθ that satisfies the first inequality while ρaθ = 1
provides an upper bound on the set of ρaθ that satisfies the second inequality. If r < 0 we get the
opposite, ρaθ = 1 provides a upper bound on the set of ρaθ that satisfies the first inequality while
ρaθ = 1 provides a lower bound on the set of ρaθ that satisfies the second inequality. Thus, if r > 0,
then the inequality (58) provides the lower bound for ρaθ and the inequality (59) provides an upper
bound on the set of feasible ρaθ for all ρaa. If r < 0 we get the opposite result. Note that the
conclusions about the bounds when ρaa = ρθθ can be extended for all feasible ρaa because we know
that the bounds of the intervals are different for all ρaa 6∈ {ρθθ, ρ̂aa}, and they move continuously,







aθ represent the solutions of the following equations:
1
r
(−(1− r)(ρcaθ)2 + 1− rρaa)− ρcaθ
√





2 − (1− rρaa))− ρiaθ
√
ρaaρθθ = 0. (61)
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Therefore, for all feasible BCE in which agents know their own state ρaa ∈ [min{ρθθ, ρ̂aa},max{ρθθ, ρ̂aa}],




aθ. If r > 0 then function ρ
i
aθ provides
the upper bound while ρcaθ provides the lower bound. If r < 0, then the function ρ
c
aθ provides the
upper bound while ρiaθ provides the lower bound.












(s1i − θ̄) =
θ̄
1− r
















































/(1− r)2 + bσ2∆θi
.
Note that by definition b ∈ [0, 1], and thus we must have that ρaa ∈ [ρ̂aa, 1]. By solving for ρaθ and
ρaφ we obtain (56).
To establish Proposition 16, we first provide an auxiliary result, namely Lemma 3, that describes
the set of correlations that can be achieved by the class of information structures (39). We define






∈ [0, 1]. (62)
Lemma 3 (Feasible Outcomes with si).
A set of correlations (ρaa, ρaθ, ρaφ) can be achieved by a linear equilibrium in which agents receive a
information structure of the form si, if and only if, there exists b ∈ [0, 1] such that:
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2. The following inequalities are satisfied:
ρaaρθθ ≥ ρ2aφ, (1− ρaa)(1− ρθθ)−
1
b
(ρaθ − ρaφ)2 ≥ 0. (65)
Proof. (If) Consider a linear Bayes Nash equilibrium in which agents get signals {s1i , s2i , s3}.
First, we note that (63) and the first inequality in (65) must be satisfied trivially, as this must be
satisfied for any Bayes correlated equilibrium. We now prove that the second inequality in (65)
must be satisfied.







i . Therefore, for any constants (α1, α2, α3) ∈ R3, we know that ∆ai = α1(∆θi+ε1i )+α2ε2i ,
and thus: var(∆ai|∆θi) ≥ α21σ2ε1 . Yet, note that we can write α1 as follows: α1 = cov(∆θi,∆ai)/σ2∆θi ,
and var(∆ai|∆θi) is given by:


































Finally, we note that by definition: σ2ε1 = σ
2
∆θi








which is the second inequality in (65).
Finally, we prove that condition (64) must be satisfied. For this, note that in any Bayes Nash
equilibrium, we must have that ai = E[θi + rA|s1i , s2i , s3], and multiplying the equation by s1i , we
get:
s1i ai = E[θi · s1i + r · A · s1i |s1i , s2i , s3].
Taking expectations and using the law of iterated expectations, we get: cov(ai, s
1
i ) = cov(θi, s
1
i ) +
r · cov(A, s1i ), and thus:
cov(θi, s
1








i ) = cov(ai, ε
1
i ) + cov(θi, ai) = ρaθσaσθ + α1σ
2
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Thus, we get:
ρaθσaσθ + (ρaθ − ρaφ)σaσθ(
1
b
− 1) = σ2θ + rρaφσaσθ,
and re-arranging terms we get (64).
(Only If) Let (θi, θ̄, ai, A) be a Bayes correlated equilibrium with correlations (ρaθ, ρaφ, ρaa)
satisfying (63)-(65). We will show that there exists a information structure si, under which the
Bayes Nash equilibrium induces the random variables (θi, θ̄, ai, A).
Let ε1i be a random variable that is uncorrelated with ∆θi and θ̄ (and thus it is a noise term)
with variance σ2ε1 = (1− b)σ2∆θi/b and such that:




Define signals s1i and s̃i as follows, s
1
i , θi + ε
1
i ,




Thus, by definition s1i and s̃i are informationally equivalent to s
1
i and ai. Note that by definition
cov(s̃i,∆θi) = 0. Thus, we can define:





and write signal s̃i as follows: s̃i = θ̄+ ε̃i, where ε̃i is a noise term (thus independent of θ̄ and ∆θi)
with a correlation of ρε̃ε̃ across agents. Note that ai = E[θi + rA|s1i , ai] holds if and only if:
µa = µθ + rµA, σa = ρaθσθ + rρaaσa, cov(ai, s
1
i ) = cov(θi, s
1
i ) + r cov(A, s
1
i ). (66)
To show this, just note that we can define a random variable z as follows: zi , E[θi + rA|s1i , ai],
and impose ai = zi. By definition:
E[ai] = E[zi]; var(zi) = cov(ai, zi); cov(ai, zi) = var(zi); var(ai, s1i ) = cov(zi, s1i ). (67)
These corresponds to conditions (66) (obviously, since ai = zi, cov(ai, zi) = var(zi) or cov(ai, zi) =
var(ai) are redundant). Moreover, any random variable z
′ that satisfies (67) must also satisfy a = z′.
This just comes from the fact that these are normal random variables, thus the joint distribution
of (z′i, ai, s
1
i ) is completely defined by its first and second moments. Thus, any random variable z
′
i
that has the same second moments as zi must satisfy that ai − zi = 0.
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Note that, conditions (66) hold since (θi, θ̄, ai, A) form a Bayes correlated equilibrium, while
cov(ai, s
1
i ) = cov(θi, s
1
i ) + cov(A, s
1
i ) holds by the assumption (64) (where the calculation is the
same as before). Thus, we have that, (θi, θ̄, ai, A) is induced by the linear Bayes Nash equilibrium
when players receive information structure {s1i , s̃i}.
On the other hand, note that the signal ∆s1i = ∆θi + ε
1
i is a sufficient statistic for ∆θi given
that agents only receive signals (s1i , s̃i). Thus, we have that,
E[∆θi|s1i , s̃i] = E[E[∆θi|∆s1i ]|s1i , s̃i] = E[b∆s1i |s1i , s̃i].
From the Bayes correlated equilibrium condition, we know that:
ai = E[θi + rA|s1i , ai] = E[b∆si + θ̄ + rA|s1i , s̃i].
Subtracting bs1i from both sides, we get:
ãi , (ai − bs1i ) = E[(1− b)θ̄ + rA|s1i , ai] = E[(1− (1− r)b)θ̄ + rÃ|s1i , s̃i]. (68)
Thus, (θi, θ̄, ãi, Ã) is induced by a linear Bayes Nash equilibrium with common values, in which
players get signals (s1i , s̃i).
We now show that there exists signals (s2i , s




i = (1− α)θ̄ + ε̄, and
ãi = E[(1− (1− r)b)θ̄ + rÃ|s1i , s2i , s3],
with α ∈ [0, 1]. If we show that such signals (s2i , s3) exists, this directly implies that we must
also have that ai = E[θi + rA|s1i , s2i , s3]. Thus, (θi, θ̄, ai, A) is induced by the linear Bayes Nash
equilibrium when players receive information structure {s1i , s2i , s3}. For this we define ε2i and ε̄ in
terms of ε̃i as follows:
ε̄ = Ei[ε̃i], ε2i = ∆ε̃i = (ε̃i − Ei[ε̃i]).
Note that by (68) we know that:
cov(ãi, s̃i) = (1− (1− r)b) cov(θ̄, s̃i) + r cov(Ã, s̃i).
Yet, we can re-write the previous equality using the definition of s̃i:
cov(ãi, θ̄ + ε
2
i + ε̄) = (1− (1− r)b) cov(θ̄, θ̄ + ε2i + ε̄) + r cov(Ã, θ̄ + ε2i + ε̄).
Yet, we can find α such that the following conditions hold:
cov(ãi, αθ̄ + ε
2
i ) = (1− (1− r)b) cov(θ̄, αθ̄ + ε2i ) + r cov(Ã, αθ̄ + ε2i ) ;
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cov(ãi, (1− α)θ̄ + ε̄) = (1− (1− r)b) cov(θ̄, (1− α)θ̄ + ε̄) + r cov(Ã, (1− α)θ̄ + ε̄).
Thus, the following conditions must hold:
cov(ãi, s
2
i ) = (1− (1− r)b) cov(θ̄, s2i ) + r cov(Ã, s2i ) ; (69)
cov(ãi, s
3
i ) = (1− (1− r)b) cov(θ̄, s3i ) + r cov(Ã, s3i ). (70)
Since (68) holds, we must have that:
cov(ãi, s
1
i ) = (1− (1− r)b) cov(θ̄, s1i ) + r cov(Ã, s1i ), (71)
thus, using the same argument as before, we know that (69)-(71) imply that:
ãi = E[(1− (1− r)b)θ̄ + rÃ|s1i , s2i , s3].
Thus, we get the result.
Proof of Proposition 16. We first prove that in any Bayes correlated equilibrium that
achieves (ρ(ρaa), ρaa) subject to (63)-(65) must satisfy the following two conditions. If b < 1 then
both inequalities in (65) must be satisfied with equality. If b = 1 then at least one of the inequalities
in (65) must be satisfied with equality.





























Note that we need to maximize ρaθ given the previous two inequalities. Thus, it is clear that at
least one of these inequalities must be binding. Thus, inequality (72) or (73) must be binding (it
is easy to check that there exists values of ρaθ such that either inequality is strict). Thus, at least
one of the restrictions must always be satisfied with equality. We now show that, if b ∈ (0, 1), then
both inequalities must be satisfied with equality. To show this just note that the derivative of the
right hand side of the inequalities with respect to b is different than 0. Thus, if just one of the
Information and Volatility: Supplemental Material October 15, 2014 14
constraints is binding and the other one is not, then one can change b and relax both constraints,
which allow to get a higher ρaθ. Note that the argument also holds for b = 0, as in this case the
second inequality will be satisfied with slack, while the right hand side of the first inequality will
be decreasing with respect to b. Thus, we must have that at the maximum ρaθ both constraints are
binding or b = 1.
By the previous argument, ρaθ is achieved by b = 1 or both (72) and (73) are satisfied with
equality. If b = 1 then agents know their own payoffs. By Proposition 3, if both (72) and (73) are
satisfied with equality, then the information structure that achieves this correlations must satisfy
that σε2, σε3 ∈ {0,∞}. Thus, we can calculate ρaθ using Propositions 13-14.
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